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FOREWORDCONTENTS
The persistent social and economic 
inequalities across the UK need to be 
challenged. This need is heightened by 
the political and economic uncertainties 
brought by Brexit and the global challenges 
of technological and climate change. 
This report by the University of Liverpool 
Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, titled 
‘‘National’ Spatial Strategies in an Age of Inequality’, is therefore 
very timely.
Cities and regions are increasingly taking ownership of their 
futures through the devolution agenda, yet deeper structural 
inequalities cannot be tackled by local action alone. National 
frameworks are needed, not least, given the lack of one for 
England and, more generally, because of the sectoral approach 
which is taken to policy.
In October 2018 I therefore launched the UK2070 Commission, an 
independent inquiry into city and regional inequalities in the UK. 
The UK2070 Commission not only aims to Illuminate the nature 
of these inequalities but also to Illustrate the potential value of 
national spatial frameworks, and to identify the range of policy 
interventions needed to address them, including governance and 
fiscal instruments. The UK2070 Commission will report its findings 
in November 2019. 
This report profiles international practice and draws together 
valuable experience from Wales, France, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, Ireland, and England.  It identifies fifteen ‘lessons’ which 
in combination have implications for a potential new generation 
of national spatial planning in the UK and beyond. 
This report was submitted initially as a response to the UK2070 
Commission’s call for evidence. I am therefore delighted to see 
it now published as a Policy Report by the University of Liverpool 
Heseltine Institute. Gleaned from direct experience in the practice 
of national spatial planning, it will inform the considerations of 
the UK2070 Commission and of all those seeking more effective 
planning of development across the UK. 
Lord Kerslake
Chair of the UK2070 Commission 
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‘We have reached a tipping point. Inequality can no longer be treated as an 
afterthought. We need to focus the debate on how the benefits of growth are 
distributed. Our report ‘In it Together’ and our work on inclusive growth have 
clearly shown that there doesn’t have to be a trade-off between growth and 
equality. On the contrary, the opening up of opportunity can spur stronger 
economic performance and improve living standards across the board.’   
(José Ángel Gurría Treviño,  Secretary-General OECD Paris, 2015)
INTRODUCING ‘NATIONAL’ SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN 
AN AGE OF INEQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, IRELAND AND FRANCE
INTRODUCING ‘NATIONAL’ SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN 
AN AGE OF INEQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, IRELAND AND FRANCE
Abstract 
In the introduction to this University of Liverpool Heseltine 
Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place report on ‘national’ 
spatial strategies in an age of inequality, we first discuss why 
there is today a compelling imperative to return to national 
spatial planning; second concomitant with a rethinking of the 
overall prevailing political-economic paradigm, we argue that 
spatially conscious national regulations, policies and resource 
allocation practices can do more to support polycentric territorial 
development, local institutional empowerment, place sensitive 
development policy, and beyond a few ‘hot’ national economic 
cores, sustainable urban development in a broader number of 
flourishing second-tier city-regions (regional cities, their satellite 
towns and rural hinterlands); and third, reading across the articles 
to follow on spatial planning in Wales, France, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, Ireland and England, we identify fifteen lessons for 
national spatial strategies which in combination have the capacity 
to instruct planning initiatives which seek to promote balanced 
regional development.
Introduction
The Kerslake UK2070 Commission’s 2018/19 ‘Independent 
inquiry into city and regional inequalities in the UK’ provides an 
opportunity to think again about the status of ‘national’ spatial 
strategies and ‘national’ spatial plans in and for the UK, and for 
comparison, in and for the UK’s nearest neighbours. The word 
‘national’ is being used here to incorporate spatial strategies 
conceived and enacted in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
and in nearby Ireland and France. Our supposition is that these 
countries might benefit by sharing their experiences of plan-
making and execution, and in addition might usefully harness 
their collective learning to inform the possibility of a national 
spatial strategy for England, where territorial planning at scale 
has been conspicuous by its absence. And so we ask: what spatial 
strategies exist in these jurisdictions? What have been their recent 
histories? What is the current status of spatial strategising? What 
kinds of politics surround plan-making and implementation? Who 
owns plans? Who funds plans? How are plans governed? What 
works and what does not?  
In framing the contributions to follow, this introduction first asks: 
why national spatial planning and why now? It underscores growing 
concern throughout the advanced capitalist (OECD) world with 
the efficacy of the prevailing neoliberal model of development 
and widening social and spatial inequalities, exacerbated by 
spatially blind development policy and manifested most clearly 
in a so-called ‘revolt of the rustbelt’ and a rise in political populism. 
We argue that three significant developments may lead (in fact 
arguably already are leading) to a final exhaustion of consent for 
this model, paving the way for an alternative template for growth 
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and providing further impetus for a purposeful (re)turn towards 
national spatial planning:  a) post-crash (post 2008) neoliberalism 
redux and austerity, b) Brexit, and c) the emerging importance of 
artificial intelligence and big data in the national economy.  
Second, alongside rethinking of the mainstream hegemonic 
political-economic paradigm, we then argue that spatially 
conscious national regulations, policies and resource allocation 
practices and place-sensitive development policies can do more 
to support a broader number of flourishing city-regions beyond 
‘hot’ core cities, which in turn can support a more egalitarian, 
productive and sustainable distribution of national economic 
activity. Engaging but moving beyond the European Spatial 
Development Perspective (ESDP), ‘New Regionalism’ literature, 
and the EU Urban Agenda,  our focus is upon building resourceful 
city-regions which we define as city-regions capable of mobilising 
their strengths to promote sustainable urban development, 
characterised by democratic dialogue and participatory and 
integrated governance, diverse economies and growth, 
social cohesion and inclusive economies, and environmental 
conservation and resilience. 
Third, we read across the articles to follow in the rest of the report, 
examining inter-alia spatial planning concerns, traditions, and 
practices in Wales, France, Northern Ireland, Scotland, the Irish 
Republic, and England, and whilst recognizing that existing spatial 
planning is enacted within neoliberalism suggest that national 
spatial planning should attend to fifteen ‘lessons’ which together 
might enhance the capacity of territorial strategies to promote 
more balanced regional growth.  
Why National Spatial Planning, 
Why Now?
After more than forty years of globalisation, deindustrialisation, 
neoliberal reform and entrepreneurial capitalism, it comes 
as little surprise that socio-economic inequalities within the 
advanced capitalist (OECD) countries have forced themselves 
onto the political, policy and intellectual scene with heightened 
force and vigour. Inequalities not only exist and persist but over 
time it seems they have widened and become more impactful. 
Exacerbating already existing structures and geographies of 
inequality, supply side economics, deregulation, marketization, 
city-regional entrepreneurialism and trickle-down economics has 
in the end failed a generation; a rising tide, it transpires, does not 
lift all boats, certainly not at the same speed. An affront to social 
justice, inequalities are also now understood to be detrimental to 
economic growth and to political stability. 
Embodied in the popularity of works such as Joseph E. Stiglitz’ 
(2012) The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society 
Endangers Our Future and Thomas Picketty’s (2014) Capital In The 
Twenty First Century, it is clear that the question of the causes, 
extent, chronological development, consequences of, and potential 
remedies for income and wealth inequalities within and between 
societies now excites acute interest and controversy. For their part, 
planners, regional scientists, and geographers such as David Harvey, 
Michael Storper, Danny Dorling, Gillian Bristow, John Tomaney, 
Ron Martin, Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Doreen Massey, Anne Green, 
and Philip McCann have contributed a geographical lens to these 
debates, pointing to the existence of accelerated socio-spatial 
polarisation, sharpening uneven geographical development, and 
growing regional disparities (see for example McCann 2016, Gal 
and Egeland 2018, and Storper 2018) and debating the meaning 
and implications of thinking in terms of ‘spatial justice’ (Soja 2010).  
Perhaps not surprisingly then, there has arisen a new politics of 
inequality signalled by claims of a growing dislocation between 
representative democracy and popular sovereignty. Political 
populism has mushroomed in so-called ‘left behind’ communities. 
In the words of Goodhart (2017), counterposed to the ‘globalists’ 
and hypermobile ‘anywheres’, the ‘left behinds’ constitute the 
‘somewheres’, marked by a particular class, education and age 
profile, anchored in places now rendered redundant by global 
capital and abandoned it seems to managed decline. Inclusive 
growth is recognised as the necessary antidote to the further 
descent of socio-economic and socio-political exclusion into 
revanchist populisms rooted in fear, resentment and retrenchment; 
one nation politics and good jobs for all, the call to arms. But how 
to do?  Whilst the Right has shown itself to be particularly adept at 
seizing the moment (Trump, Farage, Hofer, Wilders, Kurz, Orbán 
and Le Pen, Bolsonaro), Left populisms too have entered the fray 
(for example Syriza, Podemos, Costa, Sanderson, Corbyn). In all 
of this centrist-mainstream politics appears to have lost ground. 
As emboldened ‘yellow vests’ occupy the streets, we live it seems 
in dangerous times and at least for the current generation, new 
uncharted political waters beckon.   
In the UK and more specifically post-imperial England, this 
historical dynamic has etched an indelible imprint on the 
geography of the space economy, leaving a much discussed 
North-South divide, although in reality spatial injustice and 
disparities in living standards are distributed in complex ways 
at a variety of scales throughout the entire country. The mid-
twentieth century demise of the UK’s metropolitan dominance 
over what has been referred to as an ‘imperial world economy’ 
or ‘old international division of labour’ paved the way for an 
age of globalisation and a ‘new international division of labour’ 
marked by both a consolidation of TNC headquarters, financial 
institutions and producer services in London and the South-East 
and in consequence an accelerated growth of the UK’s capital city 
as a cosmopolitan ‘alpha’ global city and a globalisation of some 
industrial processes, deindustrialisation of once vibrant imperial 
industrial workshops and port cities, in particular northern English 
city-regions, capital flight, and as a result a comparative lack of 
prosperity and opportunity (see Figure 1). Uneven geographic 
development has been accelerated by a disposition to favour 
a spatially blind national investment strategy which wittingly 
and unwittingly has reinforced and aggravated socio-spatial 
polarisation. There has emerged a growing sense in these so-
called ‘rustbelt regions’ of limited futures and alienation, and it 
is perhaps predictable that many (although importantly not all) 
registered their disaffection with the political status quo by voting 
to ‘Brexit’ from the EU. 
GVA per head, 2016 (£)
Higher than 30,000 
24,000 to 30,000 
20,000 to 24,000 
17,000 to 20,000 
Less than 16,000
Figure 1 
Regional and Local Economic 
Growth in the United Kingdom
Source Harari 2018 1 Number 05795, 5 September 2018
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05795/SN05795.pdf
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Three further developments are combining to ensure that the 
current direction of travel is not sustainable and will not self-
correct in the absence of significant state intervention. 
Firstly, a depressing although not altogether surprising feature 
of the post-2008, post-crash regulatory environment has been 
neoliberalism’s ‘Houdini-like’ ability to appropriate a crisis it 
was centrally implicated in causing to gain further momentum 
and entrenchment. Invoking the idea of ‘neoliberalism redux’ to 
describe the ‘solutions’ which have followed, Peck, Theodore 
and Brenner (2013 1091) wryly note, ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est 
la même chose’. But still the mantra ‘there is no alternative’ has 
never looked less shaky. Austerity has visited unprecedented 
pain on people throughout the OECD world but especially on 
these countries’ most vulnerable communities, diminishing key 
local government services, entitlements and social protections, 
public and private sector pay, capital expenditure programmes, 
investments in education and health care and access to affordable 
housing (see Figure 2). The response as noted has been a rise 
in political populism, anti-austerity protests, and a series of 
result in slower growth in the UK’s city-regions and towns than 
would otherwise be the case. Five conclusions are garnering 
favour in the research community: first, Brexit is already seemingly 
impacting negatively on the UK economy;  second,  Brexit is likely 
to depress the UK economy into the foreseeable future; third, the 
harder the Brexit the more damaging its effects will be, a ‘no deal’ 
promises to be a catastrophe; fourth, it will be difficult for good 
trade deals with other countries to mitigate losses incurred by 
reduced trade with the EU in the short and medium terms; and 
fifth, city-regions in the UK will be more impacted than those in 
the rest of the EU, with the exception of the Republic of Ireland. 
Of particular significance here is the further observation that 
Brexit will have different consequences for different UK city-
regions, ironically impacting most negatively those city-regions 
and rustbelt blue collar towns which voted for it.  By dint of 
deindustrialisation and their marginality, arguably these places 
suffer from greater susceptibility (likelihood of suffering harm from 
Brexit), weaker coping capacities (are less able to withstand the 
shock of Brexit), and weaker adaptation capacities (ability to put 
in place purposeful Brexit mitigation strategies) (Dhingra et al. 
2017, Los et al. 2017).
Thirdly, a Fourth Industrial Revolution, we are widely advised, 
beckons. Whereas the First Industrial Revolution used water and 
steam to power production, the Second, electricity to create mass 
production and the Third, electronics and information technology 
to automate production, the future prosperity of the UK will depend 
on the data revolution, powerful new data analytic tools and more 
complex automated systems, including and in particular machine 
learning and artificial intelligence. And so ‘artificial intelligence 
and the data-driven economy’ stands as one of the four Grand 
Challenges identified by the UK government in its 2017 White 
Paper Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future. In this 
new age, not only will software and code permit robotic devices to 
perform complex tasks;  now sophisticated algorithms will enable 
machines to mimic aspects of human consciousness – perhaps 
to reach reflexive decisions, to undertake cognitive and sentient 
reflection, and even to make moral judgements. The extent to 
which the UK is finally able to address its pernicious problem with 
low productivity will in no small way depend upon its capacity to 
roll out artificial intelligence, big data, digital technologies and 
automation, broadly across the whole economy, and deeply 
within sectors. And yet this emerging economy risks aggravating 
existing inequalities. Firstly, the 2017 Industrial Strategy White 
Paper observes that AI ecosystems are already more developed 
in some UK regions; for example in London, Bristol, Cambridge 
and Edinburgh. Will these regions benefit from this head start so 
as to further entrench uneven geographical development and 
open up a new productivity gap between them and say England’s 
Northern Powerhouse? Secondly, whilst the impact of AI on the 
labour market is the subject of much debate, it is possible that it 
will further polarise income inequalities, creating more very high 
and very low paying jobs at the expense of a squeezed middle. 
Once machines replace human beings: No Humans Need Apply! 
Our thesis then is that the UK’s path-trajectory across the past fifty 
years, in combination with current and emerging developments, 
makes it impossible to countenance a resolution to the country’s 
social and spatial inequalities within the confines of the current 
political-economic status quo. Certainly, further deregulation and 
the machinations of an unbridled market (‘roll back neoliberalism’) 
will not remedy that which they have played a significant part 
in birthing; ongoing blind faith that they can only make matters 
worse. Concomitant with a wider rethinking of the mainstream 
political-economic paradigm, there is a need to interrogate policy 
options which might arrest and reverse unsustainable uneven 
geographic development and socio-spatial polarisation. The case 
for a new national spatial plan for the UK, and in particular for 
England where the need for such a plan has been particularly 
overlooked and ignored, has never been more compelling. With 
the nation bifurcating along class and regional lines and populism 
threatening to boil over into something less palatable, failure to 
act, it would appear, is no longer an option.  We need to find a 
way to promote balanced regional growth and we need to do 
so urgently.
Framing Spatial Planning: 
In Support of Polycentric 
Place-Sensitive Development 
Policy, Local Institutional 
Empowerment and 
Sustainable Urban 
Development
In the UK, territorial inequalities have expanded without recourse 
to a strong UK Government national spatial plan or redistributive 
regional policy. This was not always so. Following the second-
world-war, regional policy ascended to a position of some 
prominence as debates over the country’s North-South divide 
captured the attention of elected representatives and Whitehall. 
Following accession to the EU in 1973 however, the UK steadily 
ceded the obligation to invest in lagging regions and regions 
undergoing sectoral restructuring, to EU Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. Undoubtedly, these funds have played a significant role 
in ameliorating what might otherwise have been even greater 
regional inequities. Given its history of professional expertise, 
the UK in fact played a central role in lobbying for and designing 
EU regional policy. But this transfer of responsibility to the EU 
did create something of a vacuum in the UK itself (Sykes and 
Schulze-Baeing 2017); as we will witness later in the report, 
certainly some parts of the UK have experimented with regional 
policy, plans and instruments, and not without success, but there 
has been no central national directive or dedicated fund of scale 
supporting balanced regional development. Meanwhile Brexit is 
likely to remove or reduce EU investment in UK regions. Whether 
a new UK Shared Prosperity Fund will be capable of delivering 
the same resources and benefits as EU Structural and Cohesion 
Funds remains to be seen. 
earthquake elections which have shocked the body politic. In 
the early 1960s, following twenty glory years of capitalist growth 
in the advanced capitalist world, few would have predicted the 
collapse of the Fordist-Keynesian compromise. And yet it rapidly 
unravelled and quickly became obsolete. As we approach the 
40th anniversary of the election of Margaret Thatcher, there 
is no reason to think that neoliberalism will have a longer life 
expectancy and there is every reason to believe that we may be 
living at yet another fulcrum point in political-economic history. 
Rather than a new chapter of an old story, neoliberalism redux 
might well prove to be the last throw of the dice for a failing 
regime of accumulation. 
Second, what does rigorous social science tell us about the 
likely potential impacts of ‘Brexit’? Of course, the uncertainties 
surrounding Brexit mean that we cannot say for sure what its likely 
impacts will be. But, in reality, there are precious few reasons to 
prefer optimism over pessimism. With few exceptions most of 
the rigorous impact assessments conclude that Brexit, whether 
‘soft’ or ‘hard’, will depress and damage the UK economy and 
Figure 2
Comparison of economic growth by UK 
regions/countries before and after crisis
Annual average real terms % change during period; ordered by 1999-2007 average
Source Harari 2018 1 Number 05795, 5 September 2018
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05795/SN05795.pdf
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Efforts need to be radically scaled: concomitant with a reset of 
the wider hegemonic political-economic model, there needs to 
be a renewed focus upon national spatial planning. Both need 
to exist in conversation, the latter being informed by and playing 
a key role in realising the former. Quite what needs to replace 
neoliberalism and its actually existing and mutant forms is 
unclear; certainly we refrain from venturing here into much wider 
debates concerning post-crash alternative varieties of capitalism, 
economic democracy, institutional redesign, and structural 
reform. These debates are far from settled and in many cases 
are merely embryonic; intellectual and political positions remain 
hotly contested. But we do note that the substantive content of 
and efficacy of national spatial planning will depend in no small 
way on the structural political-economic system within which it 
nests and draws strength from, and to which it contributes and 
gives concrete expression.  
By national spatial planning of course we mean something other 
than central command of the national space economy. Whilst 
not an altogether moribund pursuit, at least in liberal capitalist 
polities efforts to reengineer the geography of economic activity 
through muscular state mandate have proven to be politically 
and practically problematic, not to mention largely ineffective. 
Instead, we envisage spatial strategising to occupy itself with 
deploying scarce resources (and by implication in the case of 
national spatial strategising, scarce national resources) to secure 
not only the ongoing flourishing of successful city-regions, but 
also to build resourcefulness and capacity in places left behind by 
globalisation and neoliberalism so that they too might become self-
starting and energetic centres of sustainable urban development. 
Place-sensitive policy mixes require inter-alia a heightening of 
awareness of the spatial impacts of currently spatially blind 
sectoral resource allocation decisions, a shift to spatially reflexive 
and geographically conscious resource allocation, and a fortifying 
and scaling of already existing spatially aware resource allocations 
and explicitly regionally targeted funds. Following Lammarino et 
al. (2019), our approach is ‘place sensitive’ in that we see a need 
for different policy surgeries in different places; development 
policy needs to be radically endogenous to reflect the historical 
pathways different city-regions are following.  
The key terms here are ‘polycentricity’, ‘local institutional capacity’ 
and ‘sustainable urban development’. Of course there exists a 
vast literature on each and each has been subject to sustained 
critical interrogation (see for example Davoudi 2003. Macleod 
and Jones 2001 and Krueger and Gibbs 2007). We do not pretend 
these critiques are not without consequence. But here we wish to 
persevere with these key terms, albeit with caution. They continue 
to speak to the significant themes we wish to engage and convey 
in spirit even if they lack in political awareness and analytic 
sophistication. We encounter again the need for parallel reflection 
on wider political-economic reform and the virtues and vices of 
key spatial planning concepts. Alternative political philosophies, 
institutional reform, new models of capitalism and revised market-
state-third-sector relationships will in due course imbue fresh 
meaning on and afford fresh possibilities for spatial planning 
lexicons, which by their very nature exist as meaningful only within 
history. For some, the ideas of polycentricity, local institutional 
competency and sustainable urban development come freighted 
with intractable limitations and remain too wedded to building 
resilience so as to maintain the political-economic status quo. 
But if approached as aspirations not particularly tethered or even 
untethered from the existing dominant order and invested with 
variable meaning in given contexts,  they remain powerful ideas 
and laudable destinations to aim for.  
Polycentricity: Our thinking is consistent with the European 
Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP 1999), a framework 
adopted by EU member states in 1999 which promotes balanced 
regional development through polycentricity (ESPON 2018). 
To counter the established tendency for national economies 
across to EU to be increasingly dominated by their respective 
metropolitan cores, the space economy is now to be planned 
around a wider number of second-tier city-region hubs. Whilst 
growth in core cities is for the most part to be welcomed and has 
the potential to entrain second-tier cities in its wake, balanced 
regional development requires more spatially conscious and 
crucially place-sensitive national resource allocation models. 
Place-sensitivity matters as the particular mix and weight of 
policy instruments need to be customised to the histories and 
structural prospects of different city-regions. According to the 
ESDP, city-regions comprise territories in which multiple (and 
frequently interlinked) spatial systems are simultaneously 
articulated, incorporating such activities as commuting, supply 
of consumer and public services, transport, communication, 
contact networks and production chain linkages. As such they 
are ideally placed to lead regional development and in so doing 
distribute national economic growth more equitably. The ESDP 
also devotes considerable attention to the simultaneous and 
integrated development of regional cities and their hinterlands 
(semi-rural, rural and marine) as complementary units. Polycentric 
place-sensitive development not only promotes social and spatial 
justice; arguably it mobilises a wider pool of national productive 
assets and generates more overall growth in the national 
economy. Equity and efficiency conjoin. 
Local Institutional Capacity: Polycentric development is best 
realised through spatially sensitive national policies which 
harness local institutional capacity.   
In order for cities to thrive, regional and local tiers of government 
must have effective powers. Consistently, weaker city-regional 
institutional capacity is associated with poorer economic and 
regional economic-social outcomes. Better national support for 
city-regions must unfold in tandem with and be underpinned by 
stronger local capacity. This philosophy has its origins in ‘New 
Regionalism’ scholarship which in broad outline evangelises for 
a widespread movement towards the acquisition by subnational 
regions of greater responsibility for their own affairs (Keating 
1998). In more centralised states, this demands a degree of 
devolution from central government to local governments.  The 
UK for example remains one of the most centralised states in 
Europe, to a fault. But devolution of powers and resources from 
the UK parliament has commenced, albeit unevenly across the 
country: the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and the London Assembly are all 
good examples. Moreover, since July 2012, waves of city deals 
(bespoke funding packages overseen by local authorities and 
Local Enterprise Partnerships) have worked to fortify institutional 
capacity in different localities and to harness local communities 
in decision making. And in the cases of Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough, Greater Manchester, Liverpool City-Region, Tees 
Valley, West Midlands, West of England, and Sheffield City-Region, 
devolution deals have been overseen by directly elected metro-
mayors. National spatial strategies which seek to fortify the 
competitive strengths of multiple city-region economic engines 
will require these city-regions to have even greater institutional 
capacity, autonomy, and resources than they currently do, if they 
are to be effective. 
Sustainable Urban Development: The objective of place-
sensitive spatial planning is to prompt, prime and catalyse 
sustainable urban development in both fast growing city-regions 
and in a wide range of second-tier and otherwise stagnating, 
declining, and struggling city-regions. 
The principles behind sustainable urban development are 
elaborated in the EU’s Leipzig Charter and Toledo Declaration 
which prioritise integrated development (institutions aligning 
their work horizontally and vertically so that plans are reinforced), 
participatory models of governance (co-created solutions with 
all impacted stakeholders  included in key decisions), diverse 
economies (wealth for cities including new wealth for old cities), 
social justice (inclusive growth and degrowth) and environmental 
sustainability (low carbon and resilient cities). The Leipzig Charter 
is consistent with the Quito Declaration, UN Habitat III, and the 
global New Urban Agenda and underpins the Urban Agenda 
for the EU which was launched in May 2016 with the ‘Pact of 
Amsterdam’. In support of this agenda, the EU has created 14 
urban partnerships which collectively are working to help EU city-
regions unlock their potential by attending to: sustainable land 
use, public procurement, energy transition, climate adaptation, 
urban mobility, digital transition, circular economy, jobs and skills 
in the local economy, urban poverty, inclusion of migrants and 
refugees, housing, air quality, culture and cultural heritage, and 
security in public spaces.  
Improving The Efficacy Of 
National Spatial Planning: 
Extracting lessons from 
Scotland, Wales, France, 
Northern Ireland, the 
Republic of Ireland, and 
England 
In the articles to follow below (with the exception of the English 
case), to aid comparison, authors have structured discussion 
around three sub-headings: Planning Spatially (Wales/France/
Northern Ireland/Scotland/Republic of Ireland) (which provides a 
review and status report of national spatial planning in each case); 
Commentary: Efficacy and Key Issues (where authors articulate 
their thoughts on the planning tradition under scrutiny), and  Wider 
Implications of the Welsh/French/Northern Irish/Scottish/Irish 
cases (where authors extract key take away messages from their 
reflections which might have wider significance for comparators). 
The final article on the English case documents how and why 
England appears to be an outlier with no strong recent national 
spatial planning tradition of note and reflects upon what might 
be done in response. 
 
Neil Harris first reviews the Welsh experience, observing that 
the Welsh Government is in the process of preparing a twenty 
year National Development Framework re-focusing on land-
use planning, replacing the broader spatial planning approach 
preferred in the earlier Wales Spatial Plan. Xavier Desjardins 
meanwhile notes that whilst the uneven development of French 
regions has always been a major political and social preoccupation, 
the French state’s capacity to promote balanced regional 
development has been diminished; the heyday of ‘aménagement 
du territoire’ now presents itself as to a degree an exercise in 
nostalgia. Brendan Murtagh reflects upon changes over time in 
Northern Ireland’s Regional Development Strategy 2025, noting 
the particular challenges which attend to spatial planning in post 
conflict societies. For his part, Greg Lloyd discusses Scotland’s 
highly-regarded National Planning Framework but warns that 
post-crash neoliberal pressures and austerity have conspired to 
degrade, dilute and dissolve key aspects of this model. Niamh 
Moore-Cherry then reflects upon Ireland’s bold new 2040 
National Planning Framework, which aspires to a step change in 
spatial planning in Ireland following the poor performance of the 
earlier National Spatial Strategy. Finally, Vincent Goodstadt notes 
that whilst unlike other administrations England lacks an explicit 
national spatial plan, already one exists de facto by dint of the 
cumulative effects of spatially blind national policies. Alas this has 
largely conspired to entrench existing inequalities.
Collectively these articles bear witness to the uneven mosaic of 
national spatial planning practices currently at work across the 
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UK and its nearest neighbours. It is clear furthermore that the 
case for national spatial strategies in each jurisdiction has waxed 
and waned in popularity through time and although now more 
established in some nations than in others, has yet to secure 
universal consent anywhere. Equally variable over space and 
across time is the meaning of national spatial planning: its aims 
and objectives, approaches, concepts and practices. Furthermore, 
there exists insufficient evaluative work to extract a conclusion 
about the efficacy of different strategies and tactics. These 
qualifications made, a reading across the articles suggests that 
plans which attend to the following fifteen lessons (in no particular 
order) may stand a greater chance of success. Our final caveat 
is that the spatial plans under scrutiny exist within neoliberalism, 
albeit they occupy a complex relationship with market logics; our 
lessons need to be read with an awareness of history and context 
to the fore.
1. National spatial plans depend upon, and constitute a vital 
test bed for, new models of leadership within the planning 
profession. Plans require skillful leaders – perhaps even 
a new generation of planners/leaders – who are able to 
reconcile planning expertise with the demands of both 
national investment for economic efficiency and social 
control over national investment decisions for equity and 
economic democracy. The need for hard political choices 
and professional and technical expertise necessitates that 
plans cannot be wholly driven by stakeholder communities. 
But radically new consultative mechanisms must be instigated 
from the outset, and the voices of often excluded communities 
heard and ingested. Balanced regional development is 
assuming new importance given the ascent of political 
populism. Traditional models of consultation risk deafness 
to historically novel grievances and modes of political 
organisation and proposed solutions upwelling from below. 
National spatial plans will only work if they are meaningfully 
co-produced with the communities they are seeking to 
support and underpinned by participatory governance. They 
need to be authentically co-authored, not least with so-called 
‘left behind’ communities.  
2.  Both national economic cores and second-tier cities require 
support. National spatial planning must concern itself with 
spatially conscious national investment strategies which foster 
sustainable urban development in both economic cores and a 
wider range of second-tier city-regions, including stagnating 
and declining city-regions. A focus upon polycentricity should 
not be taken to imply a disregard for already hot and surging 
economic engines, including capital cities and global cities. 
Whilst one should approach claims of the rise of ‘planetary 
urbanization’ (Brenner 2014) with caution, second-tier cities 
are indeed imbricated in the hinterlands of large mega-
cities and spillovers can cascade development throughout 
urban networks. These networks comprise complex power 
geometries in which second-tier cities are not always 
subordinate and passive actors. Growth in London, Cardiff, 
Dublin, Paris, Belfast, and Edinburgh is not always at the 
expense of the rest of the country. It is necessary both to 
further promote already thriving national champions as well as 
to build the capacity of city-regions whose performance has 
been less favourable and whose prospects are less promising. 
3.  Plans should make explicit the need for difficult investment 
choices. This said, because of the highly charged political 
environment and fiscal constraints in which they operate, it 
is often difficult for spatial plans to acknowledge the fact that 
difficult choices need to be made and cannot be avoided. 
For as long as resources are scarce and there is a need to 
ration, decisions will be required vis-à-vis investing in one 
place at the expense of another. Win-wins are possible 
but are not the norm. Instead of persisting with creative 
ambiguity or spreading finite resources too thinly, it is best 
that hard choices be vigorously debated at the outset and 
consent (at least working consent or mutual understanding) 
reached concerning priorities, before departure. If spatial 
justice, territorial equity, and new understandings of equity 
as a progenitor of efficiency are to be essential criteria in 
resource allocation formula, this needs to be made explicit 
and argued for. Which second-tier cities are to be prioritised 
for investment investment and at what scale constitutes a 
key question; there must be no fudge when answering this 
question. 
4. Plans must focus upon both inter-urban and intra-urban 
inequalities. Distributive iniquities are not only inter-urban, 
they are also intra-urban. Whilst cities constitute potential 
engines for wider regional development, it is important 
not to assume the trickle down to surrounding towns and 
hinterlands will inevitably follow. In fact some of the most 
severe inequalities exist between cities and their hinterlands, 
including cities and smaller satellite towns and depopulated 
rural areas. Urban planning, town, marine and rural planning 
and brown, blue and green growth strategies need to combine 
to effect growth which works for entire city-regions and not 
just for principal cities and their downtowns and CBDs.   
5.  Plans must carry authority and be able to discipline 
decisions,  behaviours and actions. Plans must have a 
grip on, and be able to influence and direct actions. Spatial 
strategies which merely inform and frame resource allocation, 
investment and development decisions all too often get 
sidestepped and even simply ignored. To deal effectively 
with laissez-faire development pressures, it may be necessary 
for plans to have juridical and legislative force and standing. 
This said slow moving statutory plans, prepared under the 
rubric of the regulatory Town and Country Planning system 
can be ineffective at steering activity and in some instances 
non-statutory and informal plans have been effective, faster 
to prepare, and more engaged with political decision making 
processes. Whether to place plans on a statutory basis then 
remains open to debate; whatever the outcome the key 
point is that plans must carry authority and a sufficient spirit 
of seriousness to discipline behaviour and direct actions and 
outcomes. 
  
6.  Building the institutional capacity of city-regions is a 
prerequisite for the success of plans. Top down directive 
solutions to regional inequalities, conceived and administered 
remotely and from afar from the political centre will perform 
less well than local solutions, devised and enacted by local 
institutions, and in particular democratically elected local 
institutions. Weak local institutional capacity is consistently 
associated with poor regional policy outcomes. Strong local 
institutional thickness and competence is positively correlated 
with more effective regional policy outcomes. For more 
centralised states, national planning and devolution must be 
essential bedfellows.
7.  Plans need to be accompanied by dedicated state spending 
strategies and capital investment funds. National spatial 
strategies and national investment funds need to be brought 
into close alignment; ideally the latter needs to be devised 
and administered according to principles set forth in the 
former. Too often, competing pressures on capital spending 
and infrastructural funds result in a drift from what planners 
conceive to be a better or more strategic allocation of 
resources. Planning and investment need to be brought under 
a single governance mechanism; if administered by different 
institutions they should at least be legally obliged to cross-
reference tightly to each other. 
8. Plans need to be governed so as to ensure they remain apart 
from the exigencies of political cycles and can consolidate 
around a long term vision. Whilst it is essential that plans 
are subjected to democratic accountability, it is also the case 
that they are best overseen by governance structures which 
are immune from immediate political pressures so that they 
can adhere to a long term vision. This is not to invoke an age 
old tension between professional technocratic planning and 
elected politicians but is to insist that strategies underpinned 
by sound planning principles must never be compromised 
by the need for quick political wins, or even in some cases 
‘stroke’, patronage and clientalist politics.
9. Plans need to promote both vertical and horizontal 
integration in decision-making. National spatial plans occupy 
a niche within multi-scalar governance regimes and need to 
draw upon, inform, be consistent with and consolidate EU 
regional policy, regional and city plans and community and 
neighbourhood initiatives (vertical integration). At national 
level, there also needs to be integration across the breadth 
of the government’s own departments. A cross-sectoral, all 
-of-government approach is needed, in which departments 
future-proof their spend systematically against an agreed list 
of spatial priorities (horizontal integration). Plans need to be 
reinforced rather than undercut by sectoral policies enacted 
at other levels and elsewhere in the state machinery. National 
spatial planning can be compromised by fiscal regimes which 
bring city-regions into a heightened competition. Where the 
local tax base constitutes an important revenue stream, local 
authorities can be driven into a competition for investment 
and a ‘race for rates’ which can in turn undermine their 
enthusiasm for spatial equity and balanced regional growth. 
The fiscal environment has a role to play in incentivising 
and disincentivising popular subscription to the principle of 
national spatial planning.
10. A wider concept of economy is required: economic 
development is best achieved by supporting a mixed 
economy cherishing each of the ‘market economy’, the 
‘foundational economy’, and the ‘social economy’ and 
therein interactions between all three. Spatial strategising 
should occupy itself with building resourceful city-regions. 
Certainly, such regions ought to be able to better compete 
in the national and global economy. Plans should work with 
national, regional, and local industrial and development 
agencies to support the attraction of FDI, the growth of SMEs 
and an indigenous export sector and the promotion of skills 
and innovation policies. But alongside the central role of the 
market or ‘commodity economy’, the foundational economy’ 
and the ‘social economy’ also have a role to play in the 
renaissance of particularly lagging places. The former invites 
debate concerning the role of public ownership and public 
sector entrepreneurship in directing and better harnessing 
(through new procurement practices for instance) critical 
and often invisible, essential but mundane ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
infrastructure (for example transport, energy, digital capacity, 
ports) and items of collective consumption (for example schools, 
hospitals, and houses) (Bentham et al. 2013). The latter suggest 
a new focus upon social enterprise and economic actors with 
ethical motives who exist in opposition to strictly market logics 
(Murtagh 2018). Diverse economies should be managed so 
that they complement and reinforce each other. Finally, welfare 
and welfare reform has a role to play in supporting all three 
economies, by addressing health inequalities, education 
disadvantage, a lack of affordable housing, poverty, and 
precarity, all of which undermine productivity.
11. Plans should knit together development visions which cross 
borders. Spatial plans introduced in countries which share a 
border should be designed so as to be complementary. Where 
possible, cross-border spatial planning, itself a distinctive 
planning tradition with its own competencies, skills and 
expertise, should be undertaken, not least because border 
regions often face unique challenges and can in some cases 
be debilitated by especially marked isolation and marginality. 
Where formal cross-border spatial planning is not possible, 
national spatial planning should take cognisance of the 
aspirations and visions for border regions which exist in 
adjacent territories. 
12. Both ‘growth’ and ‘degrowth’ need to be planned for. 
Whilst ‘overall growth through balanced growth’ constitutes 
a central objective for national spatial plans, there is a need at 
times also to plan for de-growth, either because city-regions 
are shrinking but doing so haphazardly or because further 
growth might contribute excessive carbon emissions and 
jeopardise aspirations to meet emissions reductions targets 
and transition to a low-carbon future. Increasingly, GDP per 
capita is coming to be understood as an insufficient and 
perhaps even a distracting and unhelpful indicator of regional 
development. Unplanned de-growth can be as deleterious as 
unplanned growth; planned de-growth in contrast can be as 
productive and beneficial as planned growth.
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 13. Plans should be informed by international good practice. 
It is clear that planners are interested in the work being 
undertaken in other countries and already policy ideas are 
being shared and trafficked. But much more could be done. 
There is now a wealth of expertise capturing learning from 
prior experiences of designing and implementing national 
spatial strategies. Of course learning culled from one context 
cannot easily be applied to good effect in other contexts. 
But equally there is no reason to begin in each instance from 
scratch and reinvent the wheel. Expertise is easily accessible 
and routinely sourced through established policy transfer 
and exchange networks. Networks such as those supported 
by the ERDF’s ESPON (territorial development) and Urbact 
III (sustainable urban development) programmes provide 
learning opportunities and resources for improved spatial 
planning. Universities and ‘knowledge quarters’ meanwhile 
present essential partners, not least as they themselves seek 
to build data infrastructures and extend their impact and reach 
through enhanced civic engagement. 
14 Plans need to be delivered on. Once established, it is 
important that plans are seen to be followed through on. 
Persistent failure to implement plans fully – or even partially 
– may undermine public enthusiasm for spatial planning per 
se. Inaction is not only disappointing but it can be corrosive, 
and a litany of past failure can lead to paralysing apathy for 
the wider endeavour and unhealthy cynicism. We must not 
pretend to plan if we do not plan to plan.  
15. The efficacy of plans needs to be subject to constant 
appraisal. To ensure that plans are  evaluated according to 
their merit and that their strengths and weaknesses are widely 
understood, there needs to be a political commitment to 
evidence-based and scheduled monitoring – from the outset 
so that a baseline and results framework can be put in place. 
Conclusion
Forty years of neoliberal economic development and socio-
spatial inequality, in combination with a decade of biting austerity, 
Brexit’s uneven geographical risks and impacts, and the potential 
geographically polarising consequences of a much vaunted 
Fourth Industrial Revolution, necessitate that urgent attention 
is placed (once again) on national spatial planning and national 
spatial strategies. These plans and strategies need to emerge in 
conversation with a rethinking on the institutional configuration 
of the dominant political-economic mainstream; spatial planning 
philosophies, concepts, and practices assume meaning and 
purpose only within given historical conditions. For us, there 
is an urgent need to interrogate the spatially differentiated 
impacts of currently spatially blind national policies and resource 
allocation practices and within the context of debates concerning 
new varieties of capitalism, economic democracy, institutional 
and regulatory shifts, alternative growth paradigms, diverse 
economies, and evolving thinking on market-state-civil society 
relationships; to work towards a plan which fosters  polycentricity, 
more strategic and spatially conscious and purposeful investment 
in support of a wider number of flourishing second-tier city-regions, 
stronger local institutions, and a dedicated pursuit of sustainable 
urban development. Countries will prosper if the right balance 
of city-regions prosper; a more distributed space economy will 
address unsustainable social inequalities, will be good for the 
economy overall, and may arrest the currency enjoyed by at times 
regressive political populisms in the UK’s left-behind communities. 
The purpose of this Heseltine Institute report is to bring into 
conversation the recent national spatial strategies which have 
been pursued in Wales, France, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and 
the Republic of Ireland – so as to inform each of the others and to 
extract lessons for England, a nation with an unfortunate absence 
of consequential national spatial strategising. These plans exist 
within the neoliberal mainstream – albeit working in complex 
ways with market logics. As such, conclusions reached as to their 
efficacy need to be understood within context. Nevertheless, our 
reading of the articles which now follow has led us to identify 
fifteen lessons which might prove helpful for spatial planners; our 
list is not exhaustive. We leave it to the reader to assess the extent 
to which they agree with our conclusions or extract alternative 
conclusions of their own.  
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Abstract
The Welsh Government is in the process of preparing a National 
Development Framework, a document that will set out a 20-year 
land-use framework for Wales. The Framework will replace the 
Wales Spatial Plan. There are important differences in these 
two consecutive efforts to engage in national-level planning. 
The most notable of these differences is a recent re-focusing 
on land-use planning in the Framework rather than the broader 
spatial planning approach reflected in the Wales Spatial Plan. 
This article explores the implications for the Framework of 
this apparent retrenchment from spatial planning to land-use 
planning.
Planning Wales Spatially 
“Wales is passing through a period of unusually rapid social 
and economic change…it is right that, at this moment, we 
should pause to consider the whole scene and examine the 
economy of Wales and the environment of its people. This…
is, indeed, the first occasion when Her Majesty’s Government 
has brought together all the issues which affect the economic, 
social, and cultural background of life in modern Wales.” 
(Cledwyn Hughes, Secretary of State for Wales, in the Foreword 
to ‘Wales: The Way Ahead’ (1967)). 
This opening statement is taken from Wales: The Way Ahead, a 
report presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Wales 
during the late 1960s. The report proclaimed itself as the first 
attempt by government to explore and plan for Wales as a national 
space, although the language of the report is careful to identify 
and emphasise Wales simply as ‘a part of the United Kingdom’. 
Some of the themes identified in the report are depressingly 
familiar today, particularly in relation to comparatively low levels of 
economic activity in Wales compared to other parts of the United 
Kingdom. Yet Wales has also changed in dramatic ways in the 
period of over fifty years since the report was published – the 
economy has undergone significant restructuring, accessibility 
has improved, and the environment and landscape has in 
many cases been enhanced. The principal reason for opening 
this introduction with an extract from Wales: The Way Ahead, 
however, is to highlight that not only was it the first attempt at 
national planning of modern Wales; it would also be the last for 
over 30 years and until the advent of political devolution and the 
establishment of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999.
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Figure 3 
The Wales Spatial Plan:  
A National Vision
Source Duncan G (2008) People, Places, Futures: The Wales Spatial Plan (Welsh Assemby Cardiff)
https://gov.wales/docs/desh/publications/130701wales-spatial-plan-2008-update-en.pdf p29
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The formation of the Assembly in 1999 witnessed an acceleration 
in interest in Wales as a nation, alongside a proliferation 
of policies, strategies and initiatives. The Welsh Assembly 
Government, as it was then, became interested in exploring what 
has been characterised as ‘spatial planning’ and worked towards 
preparation of a national spatial plan. There are several reasons 
for this interest in developing a spatial plan for Wales. These 
include the publication of the European Spatial Development 
Perspective at the same time as the first Assembly elections 
took place. The European Spatial Development Perspective 
offered a renewed way of thinking strategically and spatially 
about territories and national spaces. The act of devolution to 
Wales also focused attention on Wales as a political space, as a 
territory and as a nation. The raft of sectoral policies produced 
by the Welsh Assembly Government – for transport, education, 
culture, language, sport, recreation and so on – also created a 
policy environment that demanded some form of integration and 
understanding of how all of these came together to impact on 
different areas of Wales. Devolution to the National Assembly 
for Wales was also preceded by Wales shifting to a system of 
unitary local government, resulting in a loss of strategic planning 
capacity as local government abandoned its two-tier structure, 
and fragmented into 22 local authorities. A spatial plan for Wales 
provided an opportunity to address this loss of strategic planning. 
These precipitating factors were all threaded together by the Welsh 
Assembly Government’s Minister for Environment, Transport and 
Planning, who personally drove forward the initiative to prepare a 
National Spatial Planning Framework for Wales.
That early initiative to prepare a National Spatial Planning 
Framework for Wales evolved in the following years into The 
Wales Spatial Plan. The Wales Spatial Plan was initially built 
on an emerging spatial evidence base, as well as extensive 
consultation with stakeholders in the different parts of Wales. The 
early initiative had been to prepare a strategic document to guide 
local planning authorities’ preparation of local land use plans and 
decision-making on planning applications. The Wales Spatial Plan 
attracted wider ministerial interest and rapidly became a document 
designed to integrate and reflect the spectrum of Welsh Assembly 
Government policies, strategies and initiatives. This was the Plan’s 
pinnacle in terms of political and professional relevance. The 
Plan itself went through two iterations, published in 2004 and 
2008, preceded also by an earlier consultation version. The Plan 
was also embedded in planning legislation with the passing of 
The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. This placed 
a legislative commitment on the Welsh Assembly Government 
to prepare the Wales Spatial Plan, although it did not give the 
Plan any particular status in planning decision-making. The Plan 
became more refined and detailed as it went through the process 
of revision and amendment. One of the key developments as it 
progressed was the elaboration of sub-national spaces or ‘areas’ 
within Wales (see Figure 3). Indeed, one of the key functions and 
legacies of the Plan is its definition of areas of Wales. So, while 
the Plan was to be a national spatial plan, it also created a strong 
sense of regionalisation within Wales. The creation of, for example, 
the South East Wales Capital Region – an area similar but slightly 
more restricted in extent to ‘industrial South Wales’ in Wales: The 
Way Ahead – underlines the Plan’s role in regionalisation and 
Timeline of key events and activities
1997 Referendum result on devolution to Wales – a very 
small majority of voters in the referendum vote ‘Yes’ 
to devolution
1998 Government of Wales Act sets out the framework 
for the operation of the Assembly
1999 First elections to and establishment of the National 
Assembly for Wales
1999 Publication of the European Spatial Development 
Perspective
2000 Welsh Assembly Government commitment to 
prepare a National Spatial Planning Framework for 
Wales
2001 Work begins on the spatial evidence base
2003 Consultation version of The Wales Spatial Plan
2004 The National Assembly for Wales approves the first 
edition of The Wales Spatial Plan
2004 The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
embeds the Wales Spatial Plan in legislation
2008 Revised version of the Wales Spatial Plan issued as 
an update
2011 Welsh Assembly establishes an inquiry into the 
planning system in Wales, and documents criticism 
of the Wales Spatial Plan
2012 The anticipated four-yearly revision of the Wales 
Spatial Plan does not come forward. The Welsh 
Government publishes a Wales Infrastructure 
Investment Plan without this being embedded in 
the Wales Spatial Plan
2012 An Independent Advisory Group on the planning 
system in Wales recommends a National 
Development Framework
2015 Royal Assent for The Planning (Wales) Act which 
sets out the powers to replace the Wales Spatial 
Plan with a National Development Framework for 
Wales. The Well-being of Future Generations Act 
2015 is also published and will impact on the work 
of the Welsh Government and many other public 
bodies in Wales
2016 The Welsh Government begins preparation of a 
National Development Framework and highlights 
how stakeholders will be consulted during the 
process, as well as calls for evidence and projects
2018 Welsh Government consults on issues and options 
for the National Development Framework
2019 Consultation version of the Framework is expected
2020 Anticipated approval and publication of the 
National Development Framework for Wales
North West Wales  
(Eryri a Môn)
North East Wales  
(Border and Coast)
Central Wales
Pembrokeshire - The 
Haven
Swansea Bay (Waterfront 
and Western Valleys)
South East - Capital 
Region
Areas with Socio-
economic Hubs
International/ 
Inter-regional Links
Regional Links
Key Settlements with 
National Significance
Primary Key Settlements
Cross-boundary 
Settlements
Linked Centres 
representing a single 
“Key Settlement”
22  |  ‘NATIONAL’ SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING IN WALES  | 23
strategic place-making. Some of these sub-national spaces live on 
in very recent activities to establish city-regions in parts of Wales.
The Wales Spatial Plan appears initially to have been a success 
story – a story in which national-level spatial planning was 
recognised as politically and professionally useful. The Plan 
exemplified the ‘spatial planning approach’ that was commended 
and promoted in academic circles at the time. It was a strategic 
plan, it integrated a wide range of different themes and topics, 
and it expressed them spatially. The Plan was, however, about 
to fall out of political favour almost as quickly as it had found 
political support. The second, revised version of the Wales Spatial 
Plan published in 2008 was, despite a planned four-yearly cycle 
of revision, to be the last version published. A succession of 
planning reviews and inquiries into the operation of the planning 
system unleashed a series of fundamental criticisms of the Wales 
Spatial Plan. The National Assembly for Wales published its own 
inquiry into planning in Wales in early 2011. The Inquiry’s report 
identified a lack of clarity in the role and purpose of the Wales 
Spatial Plan, especially in relation to its position in the town and 
country planning system. The same report also cited criticisms of 
the Plan by the Home Builders Federation that it was ‘difficult to 
pin down what the Wales Spatial Plan does’. The Home Builders 
Federation noted the Plan’s ‘laudable aspirations’, yet found it 
lacked traction within the Local Development Plans prepared by 
local planning authorities. In other words, it was difficult to identify 
what the Plan meant for plans and projects ‘on the ground’.
A second independent review of the planning system 
commissioned by the Welsh Government followed quick on the 
heels of the Assembly’s inquiry and also concluded that the Wales 
Spatial Plan provided insufficient steer for local land-use planning 
policy and decisions. This Independent Advisory Group review 
recommended that the Wales Spatial Plan be replaced with a 
National Development Framework. The Welsh Government has 
accepted this recommendation and is presently working on its 
National Development Framework for Wales. Once completed, 
the National Development Framework will replace the Wales 
Spatial Plan. This point – the replacing of the Wales Spatial Plan 
– has come as a surprise to some stakeholders, given that earlier 
criticisms of the Plan were understood by many to have killed off 
the Plan entirely. The intention to prepare a National Development 
Framework feels like a case of ‘back to the future’ – a potential 
reinvention of a tool that has recently been abandoned. There 
are nevertheless some important differences between the Wales 
Spatial Plan and the proposed National Development Framework. 
The Framework, once prepared, will have ‘development plan’ 
status, meaning it has the same status in planning decision-
making as the Local Development Plans prepared by local 
planning authorities. This difference is designed to ensure that 
the Framework addresses the criticism that the Wales Spatial Plan 
had very little influence on land use policy and decision-making. 
Planning decisions will now need to be made in accordance with 
the Framework unless material planning considerations indicate 
otherwise. Development plans at other levels of the planning 
system are also required to be in general conformity with the 
Framework. A further important difference is that the Framework 
has scope to identify ‘developments of national significance’. If 
identified in the plan, these developments will require developers 
to apply to the Welsh Government as the decision-maker in the first 
instance, rather than apply to the local planning authority in whose 
area the development is located. These changes together mean 
that the Framework will ‘have teeth’ within the planning system 
in the way that the Wales Spatial Plan did not. The Framework is, 
however, still a couple of years away from being in place, with a 
planned publication date in late 2020. Stakeholders are engaged 
in various stages of consultation, yet these stakeholders can still 
only speculate about what shape, format and level of detail the 
Framework will eventually take.
Commentary: Efficacy 
and Key Issues
From spatial planning back to land-use planning 
This section comments on several themes related to the National 
Development Framework as the latest incarnation of national 
spatial planning in Wales. The first theme focuses on what appears 
to be a retrenchment from a spatial planning approach to a more 
narrowly-defined land-use planning approach. The Wales Spatial 
Plan was emblematic of a spatial planning approach, an approach 
that was commonly defined as ‘going beyond land use planning’. 
The National Development Framework deliberately narrows its 
perspective to one of land-use planning. This is perhaps an 
inevitable outcome of the criticisms made of the Wales Spatial 
Plan and documented in the preceding section. The demand 
that the Framework be capable of shaping planning policy at 
local level, and be relevant to decisions on developments of 
strategic or cross-boundary importance, may inevitably lead to 
a narrower and sharper focus on land use planning concerns. 
The planning community may consequently feel a greater sense 
of ownership of the Framework than they did the Wales Spatial 
Plan. So, positively, we might expect the National Development 
Framework to be more relevant and have greater traction within 
the planning community. Yet this relevance potentially comes at 
a cost. Wider stakeholders may see less relevance in a document 
focusing on land-use or town and country planning matters. We 
may see less scope for the coordination and integration of a wide 
range of different sectors and functions that impact on places and 
how they function. The spatial planning approach, for example, 
opened up interesting opportunities to link planning to health, 
social care, culture, and the Welsh language. The wide range 
of stakeholders that became involved in the Wales Spatial Plan 
testified to the adoption of a form of planning focused more 
broadly on spatial development. There is a risk that planners, 
by not adopting and maintaining a spatial planning approach, 
will appear less relevant in helping others to achieve their 
own objectives by focusing principally on policies framing a 
requirement for planning permission. The retrenchment to a land-
use planning focus is entirely understandable in light of the call to 
show what the Framework does, and how it impacts on decisions 
on the ground. It is nevertheless regrettable that Wales, an early 
and keen adopter of a spatial planning approach to national-level 
planning, has for the moment abandoned a wider conception of 
planning. Planning is likely to become much more a mechanism 
for accommodating change, and delivering land required for 
development, than a driver of change and a means of shaping 
places and activity.
Contestation and challenge 
The second theme follows on from the retrenchment to a 
narrower series of land-use planning concerns. The Framework, 
due to its narrower focus and increased specificity, is likely to 
lead to increased contestation, with stakeholders and interests 
more likely to challenge its content. The Wales Spatial Plan, if 
stakeholders did indeed find it hard to identify what it actually 
did, probably did not constrain stakeholders’ actions to any great 
extent. The consensual, objectives-led approach to the Wales 
Spatial Plan meant that sometimes difficult choices over conflicting 
issues were side-stepped or left unresolved. The general means 
by which the Wales Spatial Plan was applied and operationalised 
also created space for different stakeholders to avoid coming 
into conflict or contest with one another. We have yet to see 
the level of detail and specificity that the National Development 
Framework will include, although Welsh Government states that 
the Framework will include a regional, policy-based household 
projection for each of its regions. The Wales Spatial Plan avoided 
any reference to such figures and stayed on the comparatively 
safe ground of generalised housing objectives. The Framework 
and its anticipated different approach to addressing housing 
issues will likely attract greater scrutiny from stakeholders. The 
housebuilding industry will keep a close eye on any housing-
related data included in the Framework, as will local planning 
authorities whose own housing deliberations in their plans will be 
more sharply impacted upon by the content of the Framework. 
The enhanced status of the Framework when compared with the 
earlier Wales Spatial Plan – with the Framework’s ‘development 
plan’ status in particular – will also lead to greater scrutiny, 
contestation, and challenge. 
Assembly scrutiny and review 
The third theme focuses on the process for preparing and 
testing the National Development Framework. The Framework’s 
‘development plan’ status, as well as the prospect of it being 
subject to greater challenge than its predecessor, demands that 
we also explore the process by which the Framework will be 
prepared. Local Development Plans – plans which share the 
same status as the proposed Framework – are subject to detailed 
regulations setting out how they are prepared, how evidence is 
to be scrutinised and how disputes over evidence and content 
are to be examined and resolved. Stakeholders might expect 
a national-level planning framework to be subject to similarly 
robust and stringent processes of examination. The Framework 
will instead involve relatively light touch processes for scrutiny 
and review, particularly in terms of how robust the evidence 
base is that underpins the framework. The Framework will be 
laid before the Assembly for a period of scrutiny. The Framework 
is not subject to any real independent, external examination 
process. The relatively light touch process for challenging the 
Framework may risk undermining its legitimacy, especially when 
it sits alongside other development plans that go through a more 
robust examination process. 
Centralisation 
The final theme focuses on centralisation of plan-making and 
decision-making. The changes being made to the legislative 
framework for planning in Wales afford greater powers and 
influence to the Welsh Government. The enhanced status 
in planning decision-making of the National Development 
Framework, plus the ability of the Framework to identify 
developments as ‘developments of national significance’ and 
thereby ensure these are decided by the Welsh Government 
itself, are critical differences with the earlier Wales Spatial Plan. 
These changes appear to have been implemented without any 
great consternation or concern. Yet there is no denying that there 
is a centralising tendency to these changes, a concentration of 
power and influence in the hands of the Welsh Government. Some 
may argue that this is simply appropriate to the challenges faced 
and the need to create an enhanced framework for national-level 
planning. We will only see with the finalisation of the Framework, 
and its operationalisation, whether this is the case.
Making it all work 
Wales has clearly been a key player in the practical application 
of the spatial planning approach over the past decade and a half. 
Wales has stood alongside other examples of spatial planning in 
the Celtic periphery, and has to some extent emulated and learned 
from the experiences of others. The experimentation with spatial 
planning tools in the devolved administrations has progressed in 
the absence of any spatial planning framework at United Kingdom 
level, and this does not initially appear to have been problematic. 
Yet the Welsh Government’s approach has evolved in recent years 
and the National Development Framework for Wales aligns itself 
more closely with the planning system than its predecessor. I now 
explore what may be needed to make this revised approach work.
The first point recalls the earlier juxtaposition of a spatial planning 
and land-use planning approach. The retrenchment to a sharper 
and more explicit land-use dimension to national-level planning 
is understandable, yet we can challenge the idea that what is 
possible is one approach or the other. National-level planning 
in Wales could embrace both approaches simultaneously. A 
spatial vision of Wales, an integration of the various national-level 
strategies and a characterisation of Wales and its component 
areas could go hand in hand with a clearer articulation of land-use 
matters. It was arguably the latter that was missing, or was never 
reached, in the preparation of the Wales Spatial Plan. If the Welsh 
Government can deliver such a hybrid document then it may be 
able to deliver what land use planning audiences demand, while 
also keeping planning central to public policy more generally, 
and injecting spatial considerations into all policy spheres of 
Government.
The second demand for the future of national-level planning in 
Wales is that it be supported by the resources and expertise that 
it takes to deliver a development plan status document for all 
of Wales. The National Development Framework, like the Wales 
Spatial Plan before it, is being prepared with limited resources 
and drawing on the existing professional expertise within Welsh 
Government. The scale and importance of the task of preparing 
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a national-level spatial plan calls for a dedicated unit, with 
assembled expertise and sufficient resources to commission 
studies, analyses and technical input. We see in a variety of 
historical examples how teams drawn together to address a 
specific challenge can deliver ambitious plans. We do not yet 
know, of course, how ambitious a plan the Welsh Government 
will deliver. It is also difficult to know ‘what the Framework will 
look like’ – to what extent in the final analysis will it differ in style, 
content and approach to the Wales Spatial Plan? We already know 
from consultation documents that it will include a suite of policies 
in the format of a more conventional development plan. We are 
nevertheless left to speculate about its eventual style and shape.
The third demand is to clarify how the National Development 
Framework will address the ‘in-between’ spaces that sit between 
the national and local scale. We have seen in the past how 
sensitive it has been to speak of ‘regions’ in a Welsh context, 
using terms like ‘areas’ to skirt around the issue. The National 
Development Framework could create regions ‘from above’ to 
address strategic, sub-national and supra-local issues. There are 
now also powers to build regions – or strategic planning areas – 
‘from below’. One of the key issues to be addressed in preparing 
the Framework is whether it will have a regional component, 
what those regions may be and how they should be defined. 
The Wales Spatial Plan had its own regionalisation, although there 
is no requirement that the Framework closely follow these. The 
Welsh Government has indicated recently that the Framework’s 
regions will reflect the existing economic regions of Wales – a 
step that fails to reflect the wider issues beyond the economy 
that influence the design of regions, and potentially a missed 
opportunity to think afresh about regionalisation.
The fourth demand is that Welsh Government revisit whether 
the processes they have designed for testing and examining 
the Framework are sufficiently robust, especially considering 
the Framework has the distinction of being a ‘development plan’ 
status document. There has been a ‘call for evidence’ by the Welsh 
Government to inform preparation of the Framework, although 
it is not especially clear what the Welsh Government makes of 
that evidence, whether it is robust, and how it informs the next 
stage of preparing the Framework. Documents at other scales 
and of comparable status are typically subject to independent 
professional examination or assessment. There will be political 
scrutiny within the Assembly of the Framework and there are 
many stakeholders involved in the preparation and consultation 
process, which will provide some form of challenge to and testing 
of the plan. The critical question is whether that will be sufficient 
for the Framework to command the authority it should within the 
planning community.
Wider Implications of 
the Welsh Case 
• National-level spatial planning frameworks need to be able 
to demonstrate to stakeholders what impact and influence 
they have. A failure to do this means political support 
dissipates and the frameworks simply become ‘documents 
sitting on a shelf’. Political support, interest and momentum 
need to be sustained – frameworks can rise and decline in 
relevance within short timescales and with changes in political 
representation.
• There is a trade-off between the wide-ranging, visionary 
character of a ‘spatial planning’ approach and the detailed, 
narrower ‘land use planning’ or ‘town and country’ planning 
approach. The former can be a high-level shaper of change 
and engage a wide range of stakeholders from different 
sectors, yet risks not having much to show ‘on the ground’. 
The latter can show more tangible impacts on developments 
and actions on the ground, yet risks accommodating rather 
than shaping change.
• The process through which a framework is prepared – and, 
if appropriate, examined – needs to reflect the style of 
document and the uses made of it. Some styles of national-
level planning demand strong and rigorous processes for 
independent examination if the resulting framework is to be 
legitimate, especially if it is to shape and influence documents 
at other scales. Less formal frameworks may be subject to 
informal processes of engagement and review.
• National-level planning frameworks are rarely an end product 
in themselves – they are usually a framework for activity and 
planning at other scales. These may be regions, cities or 
localities. A national-level framework needs to be clear about 
which of these scales and forums it is trying to influence. This 
may require intermediary scales or tiers between the national 
and the local, depending on the ‘distance’ between these two 
scales. 
• National-level spatial planning frameworks only emerge and 
succeed when the political, social and economic conditions 
are supportive. We see historically in Wales that there are often 
extensive periods between efforts to plan national spaces. 
We also see that governments in the United Kingdom have 
ignored repeated professional calls for some form of national-
level spatial planning in England. The case for national-level 
spatial planning needs to be made strongly, yet this case will 
not be heard if the wider conditions are not supportive of 
national spatial planning. 
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Abstract 
The unequal development of France’s regions has always been a 
major political and social preoccupation. Until about 2000, it was 
common to contrast Paris with the rest of France. Since then, it 
has become standard practice to contrast “metropolitan areas” 
with “peripheral France” or “small town and countryside France”. 
The State’s capacity to drive the inter-regional rebalancing of 
development has clearly diminished given both the devolution of 
power to France’s local authorities (décentralisation) and greater 
openness to international trade. The nostalgia of the heyday 
of “aménagement du territoire” is still alive. But what notions 
and tools would be fit to efficiently tackle the current territorial 
challenges? 
Planning France Spatially
The policy of deliberately re-balancing development across 
French regions emerged in the late 1940s. I will outline the 
key aspects of this policy to help show more clearly how it was 
scrapped subsequently (Desjardins, 2017). 
In 1950, Eugène Claudius-Petit, the Minister of Reconstruction 
and Urban Planning, set out the case “For a National Plan for 
Regional Development” (Pour un plan national d’aménagement 
du territoire) to France’s Council of Ministers (roughly equivalent 
to the British Cabinet). A national plan has never been elaborated 
since that period. Nevertheless, National Planning Policy emerged 
in the 1950’s. In 1955, initial measures were created to limit the 
development and location of firms in the Paris region. Cultural 
decentralisation was pursued by creating national theatre centres 
across the country. This was strengthened in the 1960s by the 
creation of cultural centres (Maisons de la Culture) by André 
Malraux, General de Gaulle’s Minister of Culture.
In 1963, the Delegation for Regional Development Planning 
and Action (Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à 
l’Action Régionale or DATAR) was created. The “great era” of 
development was marked by this institution, which was directly 
supervised by the Prime Minister’s office. It was a small mission-
focused administration of a hundred persons. Its purpose was to 
influence the actions of the various ministries so that their policies 
were compatible with more balanced territorial development. The 
DATAR was directed by iconic personalities: Olivier Guichard 
between 1963 and 1968 and Jérôme Monod from 1968 to 1975. 
It became the symbol of France’s national ambition for regional 
planning. Many great development operations were launched 
in the 1960s, including: the creation of new towns around Paris, 
Lille and Lyon; the creation of large industrial-port areas in Fos-
sur-Mer and Dunkirk; the “Racine” plan for developing tourism 
along the Languedoc coast; industrial decentralization; the 
creation of France’s first national parks; and the policy of nurturing 
“metropolitan areas for equilibrium” around big provincial cities, 
to offset the weight of Paris.
At the time, there were three principal types of State intervention 
in regional development: the orientation of company investments, 
the support of growth clusters (pôles de croissance ), and large 
economic modernisation programmes.
The notion of growth clusters marked spatial planning. This idea 
had been proposed by the French economist François Perroux in 
1955. Perroux’s position was simple: polarisation in the industrial 
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sphere is due to the presence of dynamic firms. Industrial policy-
makers had to be careful not to disperse resources available, 
otherwise they would be useless. They needed to choose a 
strategic sector, a place suitable to the sector, and attract (or 
create) a powerful firm which could then “pull” the economy of 
the entire sector. 
The second idea is to direct companies’ investments to lagging 
regions. This idea was notably implemented in France by limiting 
the development of firms in the Paris Region. Official approval 
for investments was adopted in 1955, whereby projects for the 
creation or extension of factories or offices in the Paris region 
had to pass a preliminary examination. Assistance was offered 
to companies that decided to settle in rural areas. This policy 
had significant results. In particular, it helped to industrialise 
the peripheral regions of the Paris Basin. They were the main 
beneficiaries of the industrial redeployment of industries, 
especially automobiles and electronics. Why did it succeed? 
Because the policy accompanied trends in “Fordist” industries 
which led to the geographical dissociation between the places 
of decision and design (engineering, marketing, advertising, etc.) 
and manufacturing sites.
The third form of territorial economic interventionism concerned 
large industrial or agricultural projects that reshaped territories. 
The choice to strongly modernize agriculture, stated as early 
as the 1950s and confirmed as of 1962 within the framework 
of the Common Agricultural Policy on a European level, had a 
considerable territorial impact through the massive reduction in 
the number of farmers. Other major “modernisation” programmes 
were industrial. These projects also concerned France’s military-
industrial complex (including de Gaulle’s nuclear weapons 
programme), energy (the decision to develop nuclear energy in 
the 1970s), and transport (the emblematic launching of the High-
Speed Train). In all cases, the impulse of the public authorities 
was massive and the “territorial dimension” of these programmes 
was clearly expected.
During the 1980s, the conclusion was drawn that France had to 
give up or recognize that it was no longer possible to use these 
three levers. As restrictions on foreign trade were gradually lifted, 
the desire to direct the location of manufacturing units no longer 
made much sense. Factories relocated massively to Asia: the 
territorial division of production processes by companies moved 
rapidly from a national to an international scale. At the same time, 
“industrial Colbertism” seemed increasingly obsolete (though no 
clear assessment of its limits has ever actually been made). It also 
shifted to a European level for France’s aircraft and aerospace 
programmes. Lastly, the growth clusters turned out to be a clear 
failure. For all these reasons – ideological, economic and political 
– economic intervention became increasingly “indirect”. 
There was a shift from orienting and constraining towards 
encouraging. Exceptions aside, the government progressively 
decided to intervene, no longer directly in company operations, 
instead they tried to concentrate on orienting their practices. 
Starting in 1980, rebalancing policies no longer intervened 
directly in corporate strategies, but aimed more simply to make 
regions more attractive. The three main policies are successively 
presented. 
Support for regions facing economic recession 
In France, policies to support regions marked by major job 
losses have been numerous. Since 2002, a French law has 
obliged companies with more than 1,000 employees to engage 
in industrial rejuvenation activities when they implement 
collective redundancies which by their size affect the equilibrium 
of one or several employment catchment areas in which they 
are operating. These emergency policies are therefore often 
accompanied by longer-term programmes aimed at transforming 
the living conditions of a territory more generally. To this end, the 
government set up “conversion centres” in 1984, for 15 areas that 
suffered from the economic recession, including port areas (Fos-
sur-Mer, Dunkerque-Calais), steel-producing regions (Lorraine), 
metalworking areas  (Caen), or mining territories (Albi-Carmaux, 
Valenciennes, etc.). Other policies followed, often related to 
incentives for businesses to settle in these territories. The results 
were often not negligible, but remained disappointing because 
such aid frequently had windfall effects, while the mortality rate 
of new companies has often been higher than average.
Support for local development 
The notion of “local development” has had  certain success since 
the 1980s. This notion comes from academia. Scientists, spatial 
economists, geographers, interdisciplinary specialists of regional 
studies (then brand new) all put forward hypotheses for “local 
development”. Based on solid case studies from many countries, 
they formulated notions relating to “innovative environments” or 
“local productive systems”. 
As far as territorial actors are concerned, this new theory was 
rapidly integrated into public policies. Indeed, since nothing 
seemed to be coming “from above”, it was necessary to organize 
things “from below”, in order to find routes to robust development. 
In Brittany and Lorraine (around the Pompey basin), as well as in 
various rural and mountainous regions, pioneers launched local 
development projects. They were rapidly supported by the State, 
which created “countries” (or pays) in 1995. The Voynet Law of 
1999 was the heyday of this type of development, generalising 
such pays by establishing about 400 in France. They had one 
goal: designing development projects which addressed economic 
and social issues, but also educational and cultural ones within 
areas that were not constrained by existing administrative 
limits. These projects were meant to be set up on the basis 
of involving civil society, unions, company directors, teachers 
and even representatives of local associations and charities. 
The State promised financial aid, financing local initiatives via 
contracts. Activities were not directly carried out by the pays, 
which were more supervisory organisations, but by the various 
partners present within a pays (especially local government and 
associations). Momentum ran a bit out of steam afterwards and 
state involvement was cut back. Since 2014, the pays have a new, 
highly technocratic name, and are called “clusters of territorial 
and rural equilibrium” (pôle d’équilibre territorial et rural). That 
said, the idea of  designing development strategies based on local 
issues, which are highly inclusive of socio-economic actors, is now 
very commonplace and a sign of success.
Paris and large cities, engines of France? 
Since 2000, national spatial planning policies have been marked 
by a significant strategic change compared to the 1950s: the aim 
now is to support “what works”, in terms of business sectors and 
territories. 
As of 2004, the policy pursued by the DATAR concerning 
“competitiveness clusters” was less focused on “specific zones” 
than on sectors. The aim was to concentrate public monies on 
a few clusters, managed by professionals, in order to increase 
cooperation between companies as well as between companies 
and research organisations. The final goal in this case was to 
achieve strong competitiveness in given sectors, derived from 
obtaining significant market shares in Europe and the world. 
Industries in this case are presented as having a fundamental 
role in terms of their capacity for leading the rest of the French 
economy. However, France is operating in sectors that are very 
exposed to competition from emerging countries, while it faces 
the challenge of developing technological industries generating 
high value added. The cluster policy was launched in 2004, with a 
call for tenders for projects that led to the selection and labelling 
of 71 applications during an initial phase (2004-2008).  Today, a 
third phase is in progress, running from 2013 to present.
A second major bifurcation of development planning has been 
the proclamation of Paris as the national “engine” of development 
(Desjardins 2018). During the post-war boom, policy was not anti-
Paris. The moving of factories away from Paris was also part of 
a policy for concentrating finance, research, culture and even 
armaments around Paris. In short, Paris’s competitiveness was 
also strengthened. But since 2005-2010, the development of 
greater Paris has been supported explicitly and without limit. 
Support for Paris is once again evident with the “Grand Paris” 
public transport project. This project was initiated by President 
Nicolas Sarkozy. From the regional planning point of view, the 
aim is to boost the economy of Île-de-France by improving its 
public transport network, particularly in favour of the region’s 
access points, such as its airports and its main economic clusters: 
especially the La Défense business district to the west of inner 
Paris and the Plateau de Saclay research cluster (about 25 km to 
the south west of central Paris).
More recently, the government has embarked on a policy of 
strengthening metropolitan areas (Behar, 2010). This policy has 
resulted in the creation of a new type of public institution for 
inter-communal cooperation intended to organize metropolitan 
areas. Also, and perhaps most importantly, this strategy 
involves State investments in several public services centered 
on France’s largest agglomerations, especially universities. A 
map of investment in universities since 2008 clearly shows a 
concentration of endowments in large cities, whereas the 1990s 
had been marked by a desire to extend university coverage to 
medium-sized cities.
Commentary: Efficacy 
and Key Issues
The decline of state involvement in explicit spatial planning 
policies and the growing importance of the welfare state to 
rebalance regional developments 
So, what remains of the ambitions of development planning 
policies for the least developed territories? Some aid mechanisms 
still exist for rural or some peripheral areas, but the monies are 
really becoming very marginal. The State’s “spatial planning” 
budget now only represents 0.2% of GDP. Nevertheless, France’s 
national budget does redistribute massively across territories 
through mechanisms that are not very visible, namely through 
the policies of its welfare state.
Economists, notably Laurent Davezies (2008) and Magali 
Talandier (2014), have used the theory of “the base” to analyze 
these phenomena. According to this approach, the development 
of a territory depends on two factors. The first is its ability to 
expand its income – known as the “economic base” – coming 
from the rest of the world. The second is the intensity of the 
internal circulation of money: i.e., the propensity of households 
to consume locally. Development involves employment, income 
and population growth in a territory. The “basic sector” is the 
sector that brings all kinds of income captured outside the 
territory. The “domestic sector” includes activities that produce 
goods and services sold locally (bakers, doctors, shopkeepers, 
housekeepers, etc.). The vitality of this sector depends on local 
demand and local income, which are themselves determined 
by the base and the propensity of the inhabitants to consume 
locally. Thus there are two economic sectors: one exposed 
to competition with other territories, the other protected from 
competition and relatively insensitive to cyclical shocks.
The economic base of territories is today therefore very heavily 
dependent on the redistribution systems operated by the State 
and France’s social security system. State taxes and the social 
security system collect revenues and contributions which have 
no territorial intent. They are levied roughly proportionately to 
household incomes and hence territories’ incomes. These sums 
are then redistributed in roughly equal amounts per capita. This 
mechanism allows the transfer of tens of billions of euros from 
“rich” territories to “poor” ones. Laurent Davezies estimates that 
Île-de-France redistributes about 10% of its GDP (some €50 billion) 
to the provinces, via the State budget and the social security 
system. Private transfers supplement these public transfers. 
The fact that Île-de-France loses one-third of its retirees through 
relocation to the provinces causes the region to lose a significant 
part of its income. Daily mobility (long-distance commuting), 
weekly or annual travel (to second homes and holiday resorts) 
or residential relocation (for example, on retirement) have all led 
to a clear dissociation between the “geography of production” 
and the “geography of income”.
Magali Talandier has shown that, on average, residential income 
accounted for nearly half of the basic income of settled areas in 
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France in 2005. Revenues from “exported” activities represented 
barely 20% of the revenues collected from outside a territory. This 
was equivalent to all transfer revenues. The public base (salaries 
of public employees) represented 9% of residential revenue. For 
settled rural areas alone, basic residential incomes play a more 
important role, since these incomes account for two-thirds of the 
base economy in rural areas (compared to half for all settled areas). 
This difference is explained by retirees, tourists and commuters. 
This income-generating mechanism, whereby revenue is not 
created locally through productive activities, makes it possible 
to understand how spaces devoid of metropolitan assets have 
been able, over the last decades, to see employment progress, 
the income of their populations improve, and see newcomers 
arrive to live in them, etc. 
The development strategies of rural areas therefore overwhelmingly 
rest on the capacity of these areas to capture these revenues. 
The enhancement of local heritage, support for cultural life or 
animation by markets, fêtes or sporting events are thus important 
levers to capture “mobile” inhabitants and with them, their income. 
Therefore, at least at the local level and for less productive areas, 
environmental and cultural considerations are not opposed to 
development. However, there is a threat to these mechanisms for 
capturing external revenues given the level of public spending. It 
represented 57% of GDP in France in 2016 and in 2017. This is a 
historical record, and one of the highest levels in the world. Any 
reduction in the level of public spending will impact territories 
unevenly: those areas that are least exposed to international 
competition and the least productive will likely feel spending cuts 
most painfully. 
The State’s capacity to drive the inter-regional rebalancing of 
development has clearly diminished given both the devolution 
of power to France’s local authorities (décentralisation) and 
greater openness to international trade. So now the State has 
only two levers of action: the mechanisms of the welfare state 
to balance income, and aid for the creation of a “framework” 
which is attractive for investments. However, it must be asked 
whether initiatives are enough. Of course not. Local development 
can only be one of the levers of an economic development policy. 
Bernard Pecqueur, a leading expert of local development, noted 
in 2000 that such initiatives can coexist with the logic of “sites 
set up by transnational companies which are nomadic, and not 
well-anchored in an area, and which are forever, systematically 
searching for the lowest costs possible”. Much of the future of the 
territories is beyond the control of people who live in them. To 
reinvent a new national planning policies, two questions have to 
be discussed: the nature of the current territorial inequalities and 
the tools and notions that have to be used (Vanier and Desjardins, 
2017). 
What are the territorial inequalities? 
The political debate today on “territorial inequalities” is structured 
strongly by the contrast between “metropolitan areas” and “non-
metropolitan areas”. As we have seen, national policies are now 
quite favourable to the largest cities in terms of investment in 
universities or transport. But the actual dynamics of territorial 
development does not show such a clear opposition between 
“strata”. Some metropolitan areas are not faring very well (notably 
Rouen, Lille or Metz). On the other hand, many rural areas show 
obvious signs of vitality, especially in western France. This debate 
over “strata” masks very strong inter-regional development gaps, 
particularly between north-eastern France and the Paris basin, as 
well as the rest of the national territory (see Figure 4). The GDP 
of the south and west of France is 3.5 % higher than this of the 
north-east in 2003: in 2015, it is nearly 10 % higher. These regions 
are suffering from the decline of the old industry and of the Fordist 
industry. The example of Nord-Pas-de-Calais is striking. The mining 
basin of Nord-Pas-de-Calais has gone through several decades of 
rejuvenation development strategies. The results are indisputable, 
many large companies have set up plants there: Renault in Douai 
and Maubeuge, La Française de Mécanique in Drouin then Toyota 
in Valenciennes, in the 1990s. Railway construction is developing 
in Valenciennes. In terms of industrial brownfield sites, the Nord-
Pas-de-Calais Public Corporation (l’établissement public du Nord-
Pas-de-Calais) has developed ambitious reconversion activities 
on part of the 10,000 hectares of industrial wastelands identified 
at the beginning of the 1980s. Investments in cultural activities 
have been important. The Louvre-Lens Museum which opened 
in 2012 is a symbol of this ambition. Transport networks have 
been greatly improved, notably thanks to the opening of the 
high-speed rail node near Lille, where lines link Paris to London 
and Brussels. However, some indicators are still very alarming 
today. In 2015, the unemployment rates in the Lens-Liévin and 
Valenciennes job catchment areas were respectively 16.9% and 
15.5%, compared to an average of 10.5% for mainland France. 
Also, life expectancy for men is more than two years shorter 
than the national average for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region as 
a whole. “Firefighter” development policies have often reduced 
difficulties. Some industrial regions have been redeveloped by 
such policies. However, at the national level, France’s old mining, 
iron and steel regions of the North and the East still face the most 
social, economic and health problems. Much is made publicly 
about the contrast between “cities” and “the countryside”, and this 
discourse is deliberately retrograde. But we need to ask whether 
it is in fact not masking the accentuation of other, more disturbing 
imbalances, requiring more rigorous political solutions than just 
slogans.  
National spatial planning policies need reinvention, not nostalgia
Because of the increasing concerns over territorial inequalities, 
many are dreaming of the rebirth of the “aménagement du 
territoire” as known in the 1960s. DATAR is like a myth. For 
example, many regional councils have named “DATAR” their 
department in charge of spatial policies. But this nostalgia is not 
a good driver for the reinvention of national planning policy. The 
three levers used in the 1960s are as relevant today as then. 
The country is now well equipped. With mobility facilitated for 
many, we can short-circuit the nearest city to have access to a 
resource (retail, university, leisure, and the so on). The hierarchical 
distribution of investments in function of the cities’ size was relevant 
when the state had control over them, which is no longer the case. 
In short, national spatial planning must aim at the complementarity 
of services offered between cities, define the functions to be 
attributed to each territory according to its relations to others 
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and thus think system and reciprocity rather than hierarchy and 
autonomy. Moreover, national spatial planning cannot be that 
great a redistributive mechanism that it claims to continue to be. 
Redistribution is much more powerful when it passes through 
global mechanisms, without territorial discrimination (we receive 
the same pensions everywhere in France, we access the same 
public service, we have the same social rights whatever the 
regions, etc.), and that household mobility reallocates this income 
in space through residential choices.  The true mission of regional 
planning is not compensation, it is the transaction between all 
territories, their communities and their actors, which enable them 
to create a territorial solidarity.
Wider Implications of 
the French Case  
• The acceptance of social inequalities seems to be growing in 
European societies (Esprit, L’imaginaire des inégalités, septembre 
2018). The fight for “social justice” or “against social inequalities” 
has progressively disappeared from the social scene as has 
concepts such as “equality of chance” or “social equity”. The 
“egalitarian project” is also less audible. But the territorial prism 
continues to be one of the last arenas where such a project still 
seems acceptable. 
• The debate on the nature of regional inequalities in France is 
complicated, for two main reasons. The first one is that this issue 
is blurred by ideological bias (for example, reactionary anti-urban 
discourse is rejuvenated each time it seems possible to criticize 
the “metropolisation”) and political tactics (lobbies of elected 
peoples or actors from mountains, low-density areas, poor urban 
districts and so on are competing to be the “true” forgotten and 
badly-funded part of the territory). The second factor is there is 
no clear and shared criteria to define spatial inequalities: is levels 
of unemployment sufficient? Chances to follow higher education 
programs? GDP per capita? Health inequalities? Moreover, it is 
often difficult to determine if the territorial inequalities are due to 
the local context (for example due to a lack of public amenities) 
or to the social characteristics of the inhabitants. In this context, 
it seems important to have a “reset” of the national discourse 
on territorial inequalities: too simple or too confused, it seems 
unable to combine a shared description of territorial inequalities 
and an understandable definition of levers to address them. 
• Because of the importance of the state in the birth of 
“aménagement du territoire” in France, it is still the central 
government that seems to be the “natural” level to reduce 
territorial inequalities. But, as we have seen, its role has 
progressively declined, due to the increasing capacity of the 
European Union on one side, and of the local authorities on 
the other side. Moreover, because of the development of the 
infrastructure and the growing public expenditure, the state 
is less able to reduce the territorial inequalities by territorial 
differentiation of public expenditure. In this context, the reduction 
of territorial inequality depends less on “vertical redistribution” 
(from the state to the local) than on “horizontal transaction” 
(thanks to reciprocity between localities). This reciprocity 
between territories (to foster “win-win exchanges” in agricultural, 
energy, leisure, culture, education and so on) is not immanent in 
the context of devolution. In many countries, like in France, the 
decentralization has often led to create “mini-states” jealous of 
their “fiscal bases” and competing with the others. Could it be a 
new role for the state to foster “reciprocity” between territories 
to reduce territorial inequalities (and foster a circular economy), 
not only between contiguous territories (like the “metropoles” 
or the “intermunicipal cooperation”) but sometimes between 
distant but complementary local authorities? It is a new challenge 
for the central government, not only to try to reduce territorial 
inequalities with its own levers, but also to create incentives and 
tools to facilitate and stimulate “horizontal transactions”.
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Abstract
Preparation of the new Regional Development Strategy 2025 for 
Northern Ireland (DRDNI 2001) began just three years after the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement 1998 and in many ways, 
it embodied a more collaborative, balanced and hopeful identity 
for the region. A decade later, the revised strategy (DRDNI 2010) 
kept the commitment to balanced growth but stripped out many 
of the more progressive policies around segregation, poverty and 
balanced development. This paper highlights the importance of 
spatial planning in the context of Brexit, a renewed interest in 
polycentric development and the need to promote an inclusive 
social, ecological and economic future for the region. 
Planning Northern 
Ireland Spatially 
The very idea of ‘planning Northern Ireland’ is problematic, not 
least because the identity of the region is itself deeply contested. 
Resource allocation decisions, infrastructure investment and 
the presence of a disputed land border invariably produces 
winners and losers in a highly segregated and still territorialised 
region.  The Good Friday Agreement 1998, an effective end to 
violence and a degree of political accommodation ushered in new 
ways of thinking in which ideas of spatial planning had strong 
appeal, especially in the commitment to a more participatory, 
integrated and collaborative approach. As Haughton et al. (2010) 
noted, spatial planning was firmly embedded within the new 
territorial management practices of devolution but in Northern 
Ireland, it was precisely the style of policy making that fitted 
the socio-political and post-conflict zeitgeist. The first Regional 
Development Strategy (RDS 2025) (DRDNI, 2001), was based on 
an extensive consultation with key stakeholders including 477 
submissions from community and voluntary groups, deployed a 
less adversarial Examination in Public (EiP) format and produced 
a broadly based strategy that acknowledged: the spatial effects 
of violence and segregation; poverty and social exclusion in 
the inner-city; the unique dispersed rural settlement character; 
uneven development between the east and west; and the need to 
modernise infrastructure. Within the RDS, the Spatial Development 
Strategy (SDS, see figure 5) emphasised the need to rebalance 
growth by strengthening hubs, corridors and gateways and a 
separate but integrated Regional Transport Strategy identified the 
key road, rail, port and airport priorities for enhanced connectivity 
internally and externally, between the north and south, as well as 
with Great Britain.  
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It also produced some imaginative proposals in the form of Strategic 
Planning Guidelines (SPG) policies that informed the preparation 
of area plans, sector specific advice (retail, housing, environmental 
protection and so on) and priorities for related programmes in 
urban regeneration, tourism and rural development. SPG 3 dealt 
with Strengthening Regional Cohesion (SPG-SRC 3) and aimed 
‘to foster development which contributes to better community 
relations, recognises cultural diversity, and reduces socio-economic 
differentials within Northern Ireland’. In pursuit of this aim, it set 
out an ambitious programme to deal with Northern Ireland’s past 
including the need to encourage integrated neighbourhoods where 
people wish to live together; and to facilitate the removal of physical 
barriers between communities, subject to local agreement (DRDNI 
2001 34-35). The approach reflected a remarkable repositioning 
of planning at the centre of the region’s post-conflict transition 
and in particular, in dealing with the explicit spatial effects of 
segregation, peace lines and opportunities to create shared space. 
It also stressed the need for employment sites to be accessible 
to both communities and that public transport should strengthen 
connectivity across divided labour markets.
Well before the financial crash in 2008, key elements of the 
strategy looked hopelessly optimistic. The sheer number of 
regional hubs, gateways and connecting corridors satisfied 
multiple regional, sectoral and political interests but proved almost 
impossible to deliver in practice. Some quite small settlements 
in the planning hierarchy simply lacked the size, economic 
capacity and centrality to form fully fledged growth centres and 
the aspirational corridors and cross-border connections had 
little control over investment decisions. A lack of buy-in from key 
departments, the failure to align capital investment (especially 
transport) to the SDS and a disconnect between physical and 
economic planning all undermined the creditability of the RDS 
(McKay and Murray 2017). Although local development plans were 
to be in conformity with the RDS and no particular SPG should 
be privileged over others, Housing Growth Indicators (HGIs) 
dominated central-local relations. Another EiP recalibrated the 
HGIs in response to demographic shifts (especially migration) 
but for the most part, the concern of local authorities was to 
increase their allocation of the regional share.  There was little 
real evidence than any development plan (or related policies in 
urban regeneration, housing or rural development) addressed 
SPG-SRC 3 or even understood how to interpret its provisions in 
land use strategies and delivery programmes.
Figure 6 shows that the revised RDS (DRDNI 2010) kept faith 
with the Spatial Development Strategy and again each sub-region 
was recognised in a range of designations including main hubs, 
local hubs, clusters, gateways and link corridors. The borderlands 
are not signalled out for particular attention but cross-border 
clusters (Newry-Dundalk and Derry/Londonderry-Letterkenny) 
are identified as networks where cooperation can strengthen 
viability and eliminate service duplication. The fuzzy spaces 
that characterise much of the spatial policy narrative helped 
legitimise the approach, but there is little empirical evidence 
that settlements are functionally clustered or interdependent or 
on how the settlement hierarchy is determined, other than by a 
function of population. 
The revised RDS also stripped out a large number of the SPGs, 
with SPG-SRC 3 disappearing altogether and others rationalised or 
combined in a much thinner substantive document. It highlighted 
the role of the RDS in giving a spatial dimension to the newly 
agreed Programme for Government but emphasised economic 
concerns over social and environmental priorities. A new Regional 
Guidance policy, RG6, aimed to ‘Strengthen community cohesion’ 
but encouraged mixed communities with diverse backgrounds, 
house sizes and people, without specifying more obvious ethno-
religious dimensions. A better community spirit, sense of place, 
especially by promoting a ‘village concept’ and shared use of 
facilities were all part of a more expansive definition of place 
cohesiveness (DRDNI 2010 38). 
The regional planning authorities in the North and South did 
create a joint policy framework for cross-border cooperation and 
produced a map showing where and how the respective spatial 
strategies join within the border region (DRDNI and DECLG, 2013). 
This map shows how facing gateways along the border relate 
to each other, the importance of natural resources, principally 
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GLOSSARY
Community Planning identifies long-term priorities for 
improving the social, economic and environmental well-being 
of local authorities and the people who live there. 
Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) is an overarching 
strategic planning framework, with supporting Strategic 
Planning Guidelines (SPGs) to guide the future development 
of Northern Ireland.
Strategic Planning Guidelines (SPGs) and Planning 
Guidelines (PGs) provide long-term policy directions for the 
RDS in the form of strategic objectives, set out by topics, each 
with an accompanying range of measures.
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the Lakelands in the southwest and the Mournes in the east and 
how transport corridors work within and across the border space. 
This Framework for Co-operation Spatial Strategies highlighted 
island-wide commitments in the respective plans including the 
importance of the Belfast-Dublin corridor, the challenges of 
peripherality in the northwest, the planning implications of the 
integrated energy market and cooperation in strategic transport. 
The strategy also highlighted the importance of local authority 
connections and the need to reflect the respective spatial 
strategies in new development plans  under the transfer of 
planning powers to Councils in 2015. 
On the 1st April 2015 a new two-tier planning system came 
into effect via the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011, with 
local authorities taking on operational planning responsibilities 
(development plan, development management, enforcement 
and so on) from the then Department for Regional Development 
(DRDNI, now the Department for Infrastructure, DfINI) (NIA 2016). 
The number of local authorities were reduced from 26 to 11 to 
enable a more strategic approach, which included the introduction 
of cross-cutting Community Plans, based largely on the Scottish 
model. Local policies must be in general conformity with the RDS 
and the preparation of development plans and development 
schemes must ‘take account’ of the RDS. Development plans now 
consist of a plan strategy and a local policies plan which DfINI 
evaluate to test their ‘soundness’, including the extent to which 
they have complied with relevant guidance in the RDS.
The DfINI retains responsibility for regionally significant and 
‘called-in’ applications; planning legislation; the RDS; strategic 
guidance; oversight of Council planning functions; and 
performance management (NIA 2016). As part of this process, 
Planning Policy Statements (PPSs dealing with, for example, 
retailing, town centres and enforcement) are being (gradually) 
consolidated within a single Strategic Planning Policy Statement 
(SPPS) (DfINI 2015). The SPPS sits within the RDS 2035 and 
provides the basis for Councils to develop their own planning 
policies through the development plans process. A number of 
local development plans have been prepared by Councils, but in 
practice, have not offered a radical departure from the previous 
generation of area plans. Commitments to deal with the spatial 
legacy of the conflict, poverty and exclusion or mixed communities, 
even in a broad sense, are weak at best. The emerging strategies 
along the border do seem to make an attempt to deal with north-
south linkages especially around transport, access to specific 
ports and priorities for infrastructure investment.
The architecture of the new planning system is therefore evolving, 
especially in terms of central-local relations, operating systems and 
a new generation of development plans under political control for 
the first time since 1971. It is hard to understate the impact of Brexit 
on the island of Ireland and border communities in particular. But, 
spatial planning has been mobilised at the local rather than the 
official level, with places and interests most affected by Brexit 
(usually along the border) developing their own analysis, data, 
coalitions and ideas about space, place and governance. 
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Commentary: Efficacy 
and Key Issues 
The ability to bring political, economic, community and 
environmental interests together to create and re-produce a 
regional plan since 2001 is an important achievement in its own 
right.  But its value is more than performative in building the type 
of collaborative politics that have, despite disruption, created 
a broadly agreed vision for the future of the region.  We now 
have a regional framework that interprets the explicit political 
agreements in the Programme for Government in a spatial form, 
creates the context for local development and recognises the 
importance of both north-south and east-west relationships.   It 
is far from perfect in directing investment or local priorities but 
its analytical rigour, stability over time and collaborative qualities 
demonstrate the capacity of the region to deliver a new style of 
post-conflict policy making and politics.  
However, the broadly based and socially inclusive style of RDS 
2025 has been hardened in the more economic, pro-growth 
focus of RDS 2035. The progressive commitments to addressing 
segregation and poverty were removed in favour of a strategy 
aimed at competitiveness, connectivity and inward investment.  It 
is hard to disagree with Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) that, 
as it rolled out, spatial planning tended to incorporate objection, 
marginalise equity and ecological goals and naturalise and 
ultimately reproduce power relations that privileged neoliberal 
economic interests. 
But where early rounds of neoliberal policy scripted a narrowing 
of planning’s remit to a regulatory land-use function, spatial 
planning has implicated planning within the wider legitimating 
tactics for achieving high levels of economic growth through 
its capacity to incorporate alternative visions within its remit. 
(Allmendinger and Haughton 2010 808)
But this is only part of the explanation. The failure to progress 
SPG-SRC 3 also relates to a lack of skills, explicit and achievable 
guidance and a clearer understanding the limits of planning to 
deal with a structural (even ancient) socio-territorial processes. 
Calls for planning to restructure sectarian space, simply because 
it is a spatial policy function, were always too simplistic.
 
Johnston and Heery (2016) also questioned the extent to which 
physical and economic planning has delivered a more competitive 
economy, with growth rates struggling well behind averages in 
both the UK and the Republic of Ireland. They evaluate the Index 
of Competitiveness, which measures a range of attributes from 1 
(being the best) to 10 (being the least competitive) between 2009 
and 2014.  The Index does not change at all for environmental 
sustainability (6.5), quality of life (5.3), the business environment 
(4.8) or innovation, and research and development (6.4). There 
was modest improvement in physical infrastructure from 6.3 to 5.9 
but at the same time, education and skills declined from 5.4 to 5.9. 
Much of the impact on infrastructure has been on the availability 
of superfast broadband (1.0) but traffic congestion (10.0), energy 
import dependency (10.0) and airport connections (10.0) remain 
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stubbornly high. They also note that Northern Ireland lags 
significantly behind Europe, the UK and the Republic on energy 
generation from renewable resources (3.4%), municipal waste in 
landfill (49%) and dependency on oil and gas (60%). Finally, they 
note that the proportion of the population at risk of poverty (after 
housing costs) is the highest of all UK regions at 20% compared 
with a national average of 15%.  
Brownlow (2017) concludes that the Northern Ireland Executive’s 
strategy to reduce Corporation Tax is misplaced and unlikely 
to have a significant effect, given deficiencies in infrastructure, 
weak skills in high-growth sectors and poor external connectivity. 
Moreover, the imbalance between the east and the west and 
the looming crisis in the border region are significant drags 
on the capacity of Northern Ireland to compete on a global 
stage.  Since the Referendum, an alliance of local authorities in 
the north and south have begun to think of the border space 
as a distinct region that requires a new planning imagination, 
evidence and arguments and a governance regime to better 
manage the impact of Brexit. The East Border Region (EBR 2017) 
carried out extensive research on conditions in the border as 
a separate place from that presented in the RDS 2035 or the 
Republic’s National Planning Framework 2040. In particular, 
they set out a range of economic forecasts that illustrate the 
shock to local authorities, especially in Northern Ireland. They 
suggest, in the lower-case scenario, that the border counties 
could lose 4,000 jobs by 2026, which is significantly higher than 
the rest of Northern Ireland or in neighbouring counties in the 
Republic (EBR 2017 39). They also propose a distinct governance 
regime to coordinate and ensure the delivery of an integrated 
investment programme in infrastructure, agri-food supply chains 
and indigenous businesses. This is a region where cooperatives 
and social enterprises have developed, especially through farm 
diversification initiatives, tourism and intermediary labour markets. 
The idea that a different type of economy, one better suited 
to local capacities and assets, might be supported by spatial 
planning processes is an important one for lagging regions with 
different resources and potentials. Whilst knowledge intensive, 
high-growth and competitive strategies might suit conditions 
in the eastern seaboard, alternative economic trajectories and 
logics that recognise rural traditions and aspirations, highlight 
the need for more flexible spatial planning responses. Jones and 
MacLeod recognise this distinction in their analysis of ‘regional 
spaces’ and ‘spaces of regionalism’, in which the latter ‘features 
the (re)assertion of regional and natural claims to citizenship, 
insurgent forms of political mobilisation, democratic participation 
and cultural expression alongside analogous shifts in territorial 
government’ (Jones and MacLeod 2004 435).
In this respect, the border and its self-management reflects 
the importance of ‘soft spaces’ and ‘fuzzy governance’ in local 
responses to threats and opportunities within an explicit spatial 
planning frame. The Centre for Cross Border Studies supported 
a participatory research project that worked with a range of 
stakeholders, including local authorities, to test out spatial 
scenarios for the future of the region (McDonagh 2013). This again 
offers an alternative, disruptive reading of the border space than 
the official narratives around peripherality, the need for structural 
adjustment and vulnerable infrastructure. The official discourse 
stresses deficits, dependency and the need to catch-up rather than 
the innate qualities and assets that all places possess. The first 
scenario rejects the idea of the border as a single coherent entity 
but also that development should concentrate on the two main 
urban axes (Derry/Londonderry-Letterkenny and Newry-Dundalk). 
Instead, they favour a three-pronged Border Development Zone, 
that recognises the significance of urban centres, but which also 
focuses on the vulnerable rural hinterland between these two 
clusters.  Here, agri-food supply chains and cooperative networks 
are deeply embedded in communitarian economics, but which 
also expose the middle zone to the worst effects of a hard border. 
In this context, the idea of the ‘hyper-border serves to expose 
the contingent, malleable and pragmatic nature of identity under 
the quotidian realities of fluctuating state-authority’ (Richardson 
2016 212).  In his work on borders, Richardson points out that it is 
everyday practices that energise and organise dissident spatial 
imaginations, no matter how ‘hard’ space or governmentality is 
defined.  The problem for the Irish border is that these imaginations 
are too soft, there are too many of them and they enable very 
different and contradictory interpretations of regionalism. Dundalk 
and Newry have created the idea of a Twin-City axis (ICLRD 2009); 
the official state Regional Spatial and Economic Strategy for the 
North West Issues Paper in the Republic has defined Derry/
Londonderry-Strabane-Letterkenny as a city region (a concept 
not recognised in the North) (NWRA 2017); and Derry and Donegal 
Councils have recently advocated a Cross-Border Free Trade 
Zone, which would eliminate the need for customs checks and 
tariff controls (UUEPC 2017). 
There is, however, renewed interest in functional integration, the 
importance of formal and informal governance arrangements and 
the need for a more complex interdependent understanding of 
settlements along the border (Walsh 2015). The problem here is 
that there is very little evidence that these settlements are actually 
interdependent, rather than competitive, not least, as competition 
is itself, subject to changes in fiscal policy (especially in highly taxed 
items such as fuel and alcohol), increasingly volatile exchange 
rates and investor decisions made well outside the border region. 
ESPON has recently developed a range of resources and toolkits 
to support a rearticulated polycentric concept, which ‘encourages 
regions and cities, working with neighbouring territories, to 
explore common strengths and promote more functional links 
and interactions among places’ (ESPON, 2018, p.2). However, 
few of the advocacy studies and campaigning documents on 
the Irish border show how these strategies can build a critical 
mass, more functional urban-rural linkages or sub-regional 
balanced development. A far more convincing evidence base is 
needed to make capital out of productive soft spaces and related 
governance networks, resisting the punitive effects of Brexit or 
offering alternatives to imposed ideas of regional growth.
 
Wider Implications of the 
Northern Ireland Case 
• The experience of spatial planning in Northern Ireland has 
its own unique social, cultural and place challenges but also 
raises important implications for regional planning in the UK 
more broadly.  First, formulating, reviewing and realigning 
high-level plans for a region confronting the complexity and 
confusion of a post-Brexit world is an important political act 
in its own right.  The participatory and inclusive quality of the 
Northern Ireland approach, the extent of debate, the room 
for alternative expressions of place and the idea that there 
is a corporate framework to work to (in incomplete and often 
imperfect ways) is something to value and protect.  Of course, 
people will be left out, more powerful interests will attempt to 
get their way and there is a reductive feature to such strategies 
as they attempt to satisfy multiple interests. But the process 
of understanding contemporary regions and relationships 
between spatial scales, reinforces the importance of planning 
as a political, social and community project. The Northern 
Ireland case also stresses the need to anchor such a project in 
a sense of redistributive practice and ideas about the reformist 
potential of planning as a discipline and a process.
• Second and related to this, multiple stakeholders and alliances 
have used the technologies of spatial planning to understand 
their place and the threats they face, especially along the 
Irish border.  These ‘soft’ plans and places and related ‘thick’ 
networks are constitutive of a progressive post-referendum 
politics and an open, responsive form of spatial planning. 
Their ideas, analysis and arguments should be respected 
as part of plan-making and building a better understanding 
of the complexity of place management. They are valuable 
in their own right as local collectives (Councils, community 
groups and businesses) and have used this knowledge base 
to advocate directly with Europe, Dublin and Westminster.  But 
the soft world of spatial planning has its own limitations and 
contradictions.  There is competition between the northwest 
and the east border regions and the rural middle is well 
aware of its potential to be squeezed in competition from 
any UK-EU settlement.  More importantly, it is the ‘hard’ world 
of public expenditure, resource allocation, fiscal policy and 
infrastructure that the future of places are likely to be decided. 
For national spatial planning to be relevant, legitimate and 
ultimately effective, it needs to accommodate and reconcile 
these readings of place in formal planning processes and most 
of all, the investments they direct.
• Third, part of the problem with both soft and hard renderings 
of regional space is their abstracted (and at times fictive) 
quality.  Polycentric clustering is a case in point.  It is well used 
in the RDS and in local alternatives along the border but is 
accompanied by scant empiricism about how settlements 
are actually interdependent.  Derry/Londonderry-Strabane-
Letterkenny is presented as a ‘city-region’ in official spatial 
plans in the Republic as well as in recent advocacy documents 
by local authorities in the northwest.  But there is little evidence 
of labour market, supply chain or functional synergies; that 
education markets are in any way integrated; or that planning 
can discriminate between uses in one area over another 
to protect or enhance interdependence. ESPON (2018) 
has developed guidance on polycentric clustering and in 
particular, how formalised governance arrangements can 
open up meaningful collaboration, but there is a fundamental 
knowledge gap in the nature of inter-settlement networks that 
needs to be addressed in rolling out these concepts in the UK 
more broadly.
• Fourth and related to this, the RDS, especially in its first version, 
is replete with progressive and ambitious social objectives that 
proved difficult to implement in practice.  The strategy placed 
planning at the forefront of post-conflict reconstruction but 
there was little in the way of practical guidance about how 
planners, urban managers or housing officials would remove 
interfaces, expand sharing space or create mixed religious 
communities.  Gaffikin et al. (2016) offer ideas, case studies 
and policies for ‘spatial sharing’ in order to guide planning 
practice in contested and divided cities. However, we lack the 
skills, knowledge and methods to translate important social 
objectives into operation and to understand the limitations 
of planning in the context of local community, political and 
security conditions.  Similarly, the economy of the border is 
different than the economy of the Belfast metropolitan area 
and spatial planning needs to recognise and support these 
variations and give space for social enterprises, cooperatives 
and community businesses, which are often vital components 
of the most vulnerable, peripheral economies.
• Finally, the RDS did not anticipate Brexit but its capacity to think 
strategically about the future and the risks and opportunities 
we face as a region are valuable for a national ‘scanning’ 
processes.  There are significant challenges in ageing, obesity 
and of course, climate change that will profoundly affect 
where we live, the type of future we want, what sustainable 
economies mean for planetary resources and how these long-
term ideas relate to short-term planning decisions.  Northern 
Ireland is performing badly on environmental sustainability, 
and regional planning has not had the hoped-for impact on 
renewable energy, oil dependence or waste management. 
Setting strategic objectives and targets; helping to translate 
these and guide practice at the local level; and monitoring, 
even enforcing change is precisely why spatial planning 
is critical environmentally, socially and politically.  As with 
Northern Ireland, the priority is to provide the technical detail 
to ‘drop-down’ high level commitments into decision making 
processes, investment planning and evaluations at the local 
level.
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Abstract
Scotland has a long and acknowledged tradition of strategic 
planning practice – a consequence of its economy, geography 
and urban-rural relations – and this is reflected in a number of 
innovative strategic planning measures. These have included 
city-regional planning, regional development institutional 
arrangements, national planning guidelines, regional reports 
and the current National Planning Framework model. As 
a consequence of changing economic and governance 
arrangements, the permeation of neoliberal ideological metrics 
and a public economy austerity that tradition is being degraded, 
diluted and dissolved. A new understanding is required which 
captures and celebrates prior experiential learning and which 
in the light of so doing devises and safeguards an appropriate 
strategic planning tradition into the future.
Planning Scotland Spatially
In its various forms, national strategic planning in Scotland 
emerged as a consequence of the scale of planning issues, 
the agendas associated with uneven economic geographies, 
the restructuring of post-industrial cities, oil related growth 
management agendas, the challenges of sparsely populated 
areas, associated urban – rural-island relations, landownership 
patterns, issues around accessibility and the necessary provision 
of infrastructure. 
For the purposes of this article the thinking and practice associated 
with national strategic planning may be traced to the earlier post-
war period. Perhaps the first wave of engagement was the active 
interest in devising arrangements for effective city-regionalism as 
in West Central Scotland and Tayside (Wannop 1986). In the Clyde 
Valley, for example, the initial strategic planning interventions 
laid down a template for successive city-regional planning 
exercises. The Tay Plan (1950) addressed the complex strategic 
relationships between Dundee and its functional city regional 
hinterland (McCarthy 2007). The essence of strategic planning in 
these instances acknowledged the scales involved, the urban and 
rural changes taking place and the need to devise a co-ordinated 
framework to secure economic and social regeneration.
Subsequently, and as a response to entrenched regional economic 
contraction in the north-east of Scotland, there was an organic turn 
to strategic thinking. The broad regional economy which included 
Aberdeen was severely disadvantaged by the structural changes 
taking place in the urban economies of the city and smaller 
towns and the surrounding rural hinterland. The region was also 
disadvantaged being relatively isolated. The then fragmented 
system of local government also inhibited individual action yet a 
strategic response came through the setting up of the North-East 
Scotland Joint Planning Advisory Committee (NESJPAC) in the 
late 1960s. The coalition of local authorities adopted a strategic 
and holistic analysis of the prevailing problems, identified the 
economic potential and devised a deliberate set of priorities 
for securing economic recovery. The NESJPAC plan clearly 
established a discriminatory framework across the region. The 
advent of North-Sea oil and gas offshore petroleum resources 
in the early 1970s then subsequently provided the economic 
stimulus for the region and the NESJPAC Plan provided the 
strategic basis for the required growth management planning in 
the region (Harris et al 1988).
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The emphasis on strategic planning continued with a turn to 
the national canvas. Economic restructuring and the attendant 
uncertainties for localities across Scotland prompted strategic 
planning innovations. Three inter-related dimensions may be 
identified. First, the philosophy of national strategic planning 
was illustrated by the advocacy of the Select Committee on Land 
Resource Use in Scotland in 1970 which asserted “There is a 
need to prepare an indicative plan for Scotland on a national 
scale which will show how it is intended to utilise the land for 
urban, industrial and recreational purposes. To prepare such a 
policy plan it will be necessary to take into account the views 
of planning authorities, industrialists, trade unions and many 
other interested parties. The structure plans of the new regional 
planning authorities must conform to the national indicative plan”. 
The proposal did not take this specific form but it did influence 
subsequent planning as circumstances changed following the 
economic stimulus of North-Sea oil and gas developments.
Second, in the mid-1970s, the new strategic governance 
arrangements emerged – the creation of 12 Regional Councils with 
constituent District Councils. Regional Reports were published in 
1976 – within 12 months of the new regional authorities being 
instituted to establish strategic planning agendas for the new 
structure plans (Lloyd 1997). Furthermore, when taken together 
the 12 Regional Reports created a Scottish wide perspective 
which demonstrated the new economic geography from industrial 
restructuring and contraction in Glasgow and Dundee, the 
issues around rural sparsely populated areas in the Borders and 
Highlands and Islands, and oil related growth in Aberdeen.
Third, a real advance in the execution of national strategic planning 
came in the context of the onshore developments associated with 
the exploration for, development of, and exploitation of North-Sea 
oil and gas. The offshore industry required a significant onshore 
based infrastructure – including oil construction yards, pipeline 
landfall sites and the construction of natural gas reception 
terminals. Such developments were clearly in the national interest 
yet had the potential to impose local costs and environmental 
impacts. Building on the advocacy of the Select Committee on 
Land Resource Use in Scotland a national strategic planning 
framework was put into effect - National Planning Guidelines. 
The 1974 Coastal Planning Guidelines established a pan-Scotland 
set of strategic planning priorities by defining zones for preferred 
development uses and preferred conservation uses. In this 
instance, the National Planning Guidelines asserted the strategic 
need to promote economic development and investment (in 
this case associated with the offshore petroleum industry) 
whilst protecting Scotland’s high quality coastal environmental 
resources (Elliot et al 1987).  
At the present time, national strategic planning in Scotland 
has developed further. Here it is important to consider the 
spirit and purpose of the National Planning Framework which 
may be considered a further innovation in Scotland’s planning 
practice. Devolution in 1999 provided an impetus to build on 
national strategic planning practice in Scotland (Purves and 
Lloyd 2008). The gradually maturing neoliberal political ideology 
with its attendant economic policy (albeit in the New Labour 
Third Way phase) in the 1990s had weakened the support for 
national strategic planning in Scotland. Indeed, there was an 
acknowledgement of a strategic planning deficit and this was the 
clear rationale to put into effect a modernisation of the planning 
system to meet Scotland’s devolved needs.
The process of review and modernisation culminated in the 
Planning (Scotland) Act 2006 which set out an unabashed 
strategic dimension to planning practice (Peel and Lloyd 2006). 
Central to this was the concept of a National Planning Framework. 
This was intended to serve the guiding context to the preparation 
of Strategic Development Plans – based on the 4 city-regions of 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen. There was also a 
turn to a deliberate culture change in planning and development 
practice and a fresh understanding of the new relations required 
to enhance civic formation in the devolved Scotland (Peel and 
Lloyd 2007). Since 2006, the Framework has not remained a 
static concept (Lloyd and Peel, 2010). It has matured to its current 
articulation – the National Planning Framework 3 which was 
published in 2014. 
Second, since the 1980s, these conditions have been accompanied 
by the relentless ascendancy of neoliberal thinking (Fine and 
Milonakis 2008). This ideology is antagonistic to intervention at 
large and planning in particular and the impact of the economic 
and financial crisis together with austerity have combined to 
weaken the tradition of national strategic planning in Scotland. 
Arguably, neoliberal ideas have permeated the more traditional 
social democratic value system in Scotland. The National Planning 
Framework which may be interpreted as the apotheosis of the 
strategic planning provenance in Scotland has operated, and 
continues to do so, in a hostile ideological context. In effect it 
cannot fulfil its full potential.
The account set out above would suggest that the idea of 
national strategic planning in Scotland has continued to mature 
as a consequence of changing circumstances and experiential 
learning and has remained relatively robust in the face of neoliberal 
metrics. Yet this is not an accurate understanding. Context is 
important. The Planning (Scotland) Act 2006 which brought both 
a strategic planning philosophy and various strategic planning 
measures into effect came into force with the financial crisis in 
2007. In effect, the economic crisis and the neoliberal infused 
political response from Westminster – an approach centred 
on de-regulation and which combined with austerity served to 
shackle the new planning arrangements. As time progressed and 
the crisis did not alleviate criticism of the new planning system 
began to be expressed. Scotland did not have the monopoly on 
this but negative critiques of the perceived adverse effects of 
planning processes and regulations on any economic recovery 
escalated. Thinktanks, business organisations, politicians and the 
property development sectors questioned the efficacy of the land 
use planning system.
This has resulted in the dilution of the national strategic planning 
identity. A root and branch review of the planning system was 
carried out in 2016. This resulted in the publication of the 
Planning (Scotland) Bill 2017 which underwent formal scrutiny 
by the Scottish Parliament in 2018. Whilst the national Planning 
Framework remains, other proposed changes devalue the 
national strategic spirit of Scottish planning. This is evident in the 
abolition of strategic development plans – a move away from city 
regional planning – the introduction of simplified development 
zones; the introduction of local place plans – in effect parallel 
local planning measures; and the alignment of land use planning 
and community planning. 
 
Commentary: Efficacy 
and Key Issues 
The evidence and historical experience would suggest that 
Scotland moved to a national strategic planning philosophy 
and format as a direct response to its economic conditions, 
geographical variations, social and community contrasts and 
environmental challenges. Essentially the conventional statutory 
land use planning arrangements were strengthened by operating 
in a context that set out priorities in an open manner. In the 
Scottish context, national strategic planning may be understood 
as a different model of intervention from statutory land use 
planning (which is regulatory based with respect to land use 
and its development) and spatial planning (which promotes 
connectivity). The concept of national strategic planning may be 
considered in terms of a philosophy, a statement of intent and a 
quiver of specific instruments. It embodies different characteristics 
– (following Bruton and Nicholson, 1985) in providing hierarchy 
and contingency to guide decision-making and implementation; 
matching context and method of intervention; engaging at the 
appropriate scale and seeking to secure strategic ambition; it is 
political (alert to power and influence, and the trade-offs involved 
in enabling development in the public interest), appropriately 
resourced and holistic in form; and demonstrating leadership 
and risk bearing.
Scotland’s national strategic planning reflects the history and 
experience of its spaces and places and has tended to be a 
composite of factor-based planning, sector planning, integrated 
thinking, longer term delivery and a turn to reticulism. Moreover, it 
has been based over time on different yet appropriate institutional 
and organisational characteristics – investments, regulations 
and interventions (Dembski and Salet 2010) – in responding to 
changing structural conditions and locational relations. National 
strategic planning has assumed different forms and scales in 
Scotland. The early emphasis on regional scales – city-regions 
– which inevitably carried with them a national interest laid the 
foundations for a more formal national focus. This was viewed as 
important in reconciling the different dimensions of change and 
development. 
Here, the potential of the National Planning Guideline model in 
providing an opportunity to consider national and local interests, 
to establish appropriate policy priorities, to identify specific 
development zones and to ensure environmental and landscape 
protection was acknowledged as an innovative planning tool 
(Diamond 1979). The deliberate reticulist stance in defining priorities 
with supporting planning intelligence on the underling rationale 
and advice to planning authorities on appropriate procedural 
steps attracted critical attention. It prompted the publication of 
additional National Planning Guidelines dealing with a diverse 
range of planning topics – including the development of upland 
skiing areas, agricultural land resources and out of town retailing 
centres (Lloyd 1996). The Nuffield Foundation (1986), for example, 
in its inquiry into the UK planning system suggested the model be 
exported to England, Wales and Scotland. This, of course, took 
place – with variations on the nomenclature.  At this stage, it is 
evident that Scotland had innovated, nurtured and articulated 
national strategic planning as the bedrock of its statutory planning 
system. The National Planning Guideline has endured although 
the move to redesign the instrument as a single statement of 
policy across the individual parts of the devolved UK is suggestive 
of an attempt to simplify the mechanism. Arguably, strategic 
thinking needs to be reflective of and sensitive to the complex 
dimensions of change involved in land use and development. 
Reductionism in this way works against that ambition.
A distinctive feature of the National Planning Guideline model 
was that the statement of policy priorities was supported 
(and strengthened) by two documents. The Planning Advice 
Note (PAN) provided directions to local planning authorities, 
developers, landowners and communities as how best to 
address issues associated with the specific policy in hand. The 
Planning Information Note (PIN) provided the statistical and other 
intelligence which provided a statement of the evidence which 
justified the policy framework. The significance of the PAN and PIN 
may be understood as a way of promoting greater understanding 
and communication about the planning policy and issue being 
considered. The trio of documents then set the context in which 
land use planning procedures could take place. An ambition 
here was securing greater efficiency and effectiveness as well 
as enhancing greater openness in planning decision-making.
At the present time, the most recent articulation of the national 
strategic planning tradition is the National Planning Framework 
model.  Its spirit and purpose deserve some further comment. 
First, the idea to innovate around a National Planning Framework 
was to provide a backbone to statutory land use planning. The 
Framework set out the national perspective for regulating and 
securing appropriate development. It articulated a vision for 
Scotland to which other public policy plans and programmes 
would connect.  This reciprocity and conformity with the economic 
strategy for Scotland is important to the concept of national spatial 
strategic planning in Scotland. In this respect the National Planning 
Framework presented a perspective – reflecting the influence of 
European spatial planning – and was intended to guide public 
policy at large and to inform land use planning practice by local 
authorities. The modernised planning system set out a new 
development hierarchy, which was to comprise different scales 
of perceived national, major, local or minor significance. This was 
intended to stress competency in decision making, and to better 
reallocate the planning service accordingly. The national level was 
the locus of the National Planning Framework, and the major, local 
and minor scales of development were characterised in terms of 
an appropriate arrangements relating to decision-maker, decision 
route and appeals. 
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Second, the National Planning Framework was intended to 
provide a means of integrating wider economic considerations, 
social aspects, community planning activities and environmental 
values. It asserted national planning priorities with respect to 
strategic development plans for the city-regions, updating of 
development plans, changes to development management, and 
strengthening of enforcement. The National Planning Framework 
was promoted in status, following the formal scrutiny by Scottish 
Parliament committees to a material consideration in the statutory 
regulatory processes of the land use planning system. Third, it is 
totemic in that it represents a distinctively Scottish interpretation 
of the spatial planning tradition which emerged from Europe and 
which has proved highly influential elsewhere. Scotland however 
brought its history and traditions to assert its own brand – national 
strategic planning – as an interpretation of the broader spatial 
planning agenda.
The challenges to Scotland’s distinctive national strategic 
planning traditions and architecture rest on the general economic 
context, the associated power relations under globalisation and 
emerging geopolitical domains, the implications for land, labour 
and capital markets, the social consequences in terms of exclusion 
and disparities and the environmental agendas. Neoliberalism, 
in particular poses considerable challenges due to its belief in 
economic freedom, minimal government controls and regulations 
and denial of history (Pirie, 2017). This suggests that the effects of 
diluting national strategic planning in Scotland is not cognisant of 
its achievements in the past or the ways in which it has evolved. 
The danger for any renaissance of national strategic planning 
comes in part from the normalisation of the neoliberal metrics 
(Mirowski 2013), the parallel programmes of austerity (Blyth 2013) 
and the implications for societal and community structures. In 
effect, strategic planning now operates in a new moral economy 
(Marquand 2004 2014). The future for executing Scotland’s 
strategic planning frameworks is seriously constrained by these 
systemic features – and it is ironic that it is in this very context 
that national strategic planning is needed. 
Prescriptions The Scottish experience with national strategic 
planning has been generally a positive one in setting out 
appropriate institutional arrangements to address specific 
planning problems. The philosophical basis of national strategic 
planning was forged in response to complex and inter-related 
issues around economic change and development, differential 
geographies of change, social impacts and environmental 
vulnerabilities. The reconciliation of contested dimensions 
of change, negative and positive, sit alongside higher-level 
discussions around the nature of the public interest and the 
relationship to private interests. The complexity of the planning 
problems facing Scotland over time have included addressing the 
localised effects of economic restructuring and contraction in the 
major cities, managing growth in Edinburgh and the oil induced 
economic expansion in Aberdeen, together with issues of rural 
sparsely populated areas. 
What is remarkable is that the concept of national strategic planning 
continued to mature as the ideological environment changed. 
Thus, whilst the early ideas and forms of national strategic planning 
took place into the 1970s, the exogenous context was influenced 
by social democratic values. The shift to neoliberal political values 
from the 1980s onwards, gathering momentum to the present day 
witnessed the concept of the National Planning Framework. This 
was a remarkable achievement particularly as it formed a new 
bedrock for a modernised land use planning system. Indeed, the 
National Planning Framework triggered a parallel set of national 
planning initiatives, including a Land Use Strategy and the 
Scottish Land Commission; National Performance Framework – 
2007, 2011, 2016; Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015; 
Scotland’s Economic Strategy 2015. The economic crisis in 2007 
imperilled the new modern planning legislation and the effects 
of austerity brought new questions to bear on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of national strategic planning. The root and branch 
review subsequently followed a neoliberal line of reasoning and 
devalued and diluted the strategic dimensions to planning.
There is a major caveat which further clouds what is taking place. 
Infrastructure remains an issue in Scotland. A report conducted 
for the Scottish Government (Rydens 2015) took a holistic 
perspective of the role of infrastructure. In supporting land and 
property development. Significantly it argued that infrastructure 
is multi-faceted including transport, education and services and 
these have to be reconciled with developments across a spectrum 
of markets, land uses, sizes and phases.  It correctly points to 
the tension between the short-term market imperative to recoup 
and the need to plan for and programme long term infrastructure 
investment over decades. Planning fills the gap – in seeking 
to align these interests yet this represents a major challenge 
given the complex layering of interests, property rights and 
expectations involved. The research showed that development 
plan policies for infrastructure provision are inconsistent in their 
format and the level of detail. It describes the planning system as 
a “choreographer” of other agencies’ plans and actions to help 
enable development to happen. This insight suggests that the 
provision of infrastructure needs radical review so that it can nest 
with a national strategic planning framework.
There is a need for national strategic planning to be re-invigorated 
and given the appropriate resource base. The National Planning 
Framework is a form of indicative planning and requires an 
investment and spending schedule to marshal the strategic 
development of national projects. Here priorities have to be 
dovetailed with infrastructure and devised within a national 
context. Development in time and space is not an even processes 
and  national strategic planning  can provide a longer term 
approach to securing environmental robustness, and economic 
and social justice across Scotland. 
Wider Lessons From the 
Scottish Case 
• The Scottish experience of strategic planning suggests that 
planning is a long game – it must draw on its provenance 
and history, its experiential learning and be longer term and 
holistic in meeting future challenges. Scotland’s strategic 
perspective was born of its economic, social and environmental 
circumstances. A corporate philosophy encouraged an 
integrated, longer term perspective. That is the core of 
strategic planning. It involves imaginative thinking, leadership 
and political bravery. It also rests on partnership thinking in 
theory and practice – coalition building is all important to 
secure complex outcomes which are systemic in character. 
Strategic planning can therefore contribute to more effective 
interventions at times of resource contraction – it can enable 
duplication, overlap and underlap between different facets of 
national, regional and local governance. Scotland’s maturation 
of strategic planning demonstrated the benefits to private 
and public interests of enabling greater consistency in policy 
execution. Sadly, the tsunami of neoliberal thinking, allied to 
austerity and the political priorities around private solutions 
has weakened the strategic planning contribution in Scotland. 
• The lessons for England are blunt. A national strategic 
perspective which is devised in the light of the reality of 
economic inefficiencies, social injustices and geographical 
diversities is required. A national indicative planning 
framework has to take the difficult decisions, and act as a 
strong reticulist in reconciling different interests at different 
times in different places. Thus, for England, strategic planning 
has to be about vocal conversations with local communities 
across the wide geographical landscapes of work, investment, 
and infrastructure. Strategic planning offers the potential to 
challenge the economic, social and enviro-geographical biases 
in policy and decision making. The most important lesson for 
England is that whilst a national strategic approach implies 
a rigid hierarchy of policy options and priorities it has to be 
devised from communities upwards. It must reflect social and 
community, business and government perspectives and needs. 
That is the real legitimacy of a strategic planning methodology.
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Abstract
The National Planning Framework published in February 2018 
marks a new departure for planning in an Irish context. It is 
ambitious in scope and aims to integrate public policy horizontally 
and vertically across government departments and at multiple 
scales. The regional tier of government is empowered, and new 
regional policy tools in the form of the RSES and MASP have been 
introduced. For the first time capital investment is being closely 
aligned with spatial planning. Nonetheless, despite attempts at 
central government level to ‘de-politicise’ the policy development 
phase, implementation at the local level faces a number of 
significant challenges. 
Planning the Republic 
of Ireland Spatially 
The publication of the National Spatial Strategy (2002-2020) 
was heralded as the first formal attempt at spatial planning in 
Ireland, but broader regional planning had been on the agenda 
for many decades since the publication of Regional Studies in 
Ireland, commonly known as the ‘Buchanan Report’ in 1969 which 
advocated a hierarchy of growth centres approach to regional 
development. Considered politically unpalatable, the report 
was reviewed by government but largely ignored and a policy 
of dispersal of economic activity was supported through the 
1970s until the late 1990s. Arising out of a booming economy, a 
changed political environment in Northern Ireland, and heavily 
influenced by the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP) published in 1999, government attention at the turn of the 
millennium turned to how to better balance spatial development 
across the island. Responding to a call in the National Development 
Plan 2000-2006 for a spatial strategy, the NSS was published in 
2002 and, in the spirit of Buchanan adopted a growth centre 
type approach. Nine gateway cities and towns were identified to 
act as key drivers of regional growth and a series of connected 
‘hubs’ would connect to rural areas and ‘other towns’ (Figure 7). 
However the Decentralisation Programme for the Civil Service, 
announced in 2003, undermined the NSS at a very early stage. 
Decisions on locations for decentralisation were purely political 
and ignored to a significant extent the designated gateways and 
hubs. Although Regional Planning Guidelines were produced by 
the regional authorities in 2004 and revised in 2010 in the wake of 
the crash, to aid the translation of the NSS objectives to the local 
level, these were largely ineffective as they had no statutory basis. 
While some finance was put in place to support the NSS through 
the National Development Plan (2007-2013) and the Gateway 
Innovation Fund (2008), the recession, crisis, party politics and 
sectoral interests largely undermined implementation. Although 
not formally replaced until February 2018, the NSS as a guiding 
strategy for planning in Ireland was essentially abandoned when 
a scoping group for a successor plan was established in August 
2013 and the eight regional authorities that had responsibility for 
translating the strategy were dissolved in June 2014.Niamh Moore-Cherry, University College Dublin 
Dr Niamh Moore-Cherry is an Associate Professor in Urban Geography at the 
School of Geography, University College Dublin.  Email: niamh.moore@ucd.ie
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The Irish National Planning Framework 
Over the last fifteen years, Ireland has experienced an 
unprecedented economic boom that resulted in particular in 
the uncontrolled growth of Dublin into surrounding counties, 
followed by a dramatic downturn and crisis that resulted in 
extreme austerity (see Heffernan et al. 2018). This brought 
into sharp focus dramatic spatial and social divides across 
the country: economically as measured by unemployment for 
(Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford) Metropolitan Area 
Spatial Plans will also have to be developed.
Once the RSES and MASP process is complete, a process 
of alignment with city and county development plans, local 
economic and community plans and sectoral plans such as the 
NTA Transport Strategy for Dublin 2016-2035 and the Retail 
Strategy for Dublin will commence or recommence.
Commentary: Efficacy and 
Key Issues 
The NPF in context
The NPF is a significant departure from previous attempts at 
national planning through its emphasis on equitable growth, 
strengthened regional governance structures, statutory 
underpinning and its foregrounding of ‘plan-led’ development. 
Since its publication, significant attention has been placed from 
the highest level of government in the form of the Taoiseach 
(prime Minister) on raising public awareness of the plan and a mass 
marketing campaign was undertaken to ultimately prepare the 
ground for the strategic decision-making that will need to happen. 
Among policymakers, the emphasis has already shifted to how 
the new policy tools of the RSES and MASPs can operationalise 
the broad principles of the NPF at a local level and regional 
assemblies are working to tight deadlines for implementation. 
Given the current housing crisis and previous scandals around 
planning corruption, there is particular public and media interest 
in the new Office of Planning Regulator, provided for in the NPF 
as a new independent institution to provide oversight of all local 
and regional forward planning and zoning decisions.
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example; socially in terms of access to housing and emigration, 
particularly from western seaboard counties; and physically in 
terms of abandoned unfinished developments and quality of life. 
One measure of the scale of divergence is population change 
and from 1991-2016 the mid-Eastern area (broadly defined as the 
counties surrounding Dublin) had almost doubled in population 
while in the same period the population of the northwest had 
shrunk to 67% of their 1991 values. Despite plans for a successor 
to the National Spatial Strategy being mooted since 2014, the 
new National Planning Framework was only formally launched 
in February 2018. The premise of the new plan is that continuing 
to facilitate a ‘Business as Usual’ scenario in Ireland is not an 
option given growing regional divergence and projections that 
population will grow by approximately 1 million people up to 2040 
and that 550,000 extra homes will be needed.
Unlike previous attempts at spatial or regional planning in Ireland, 
unprecedented emphasis was placed in the NPF process on 
creating opportunities for debate around the shape of the plan 
to build ‘buy-in’ and legitimacy ultimately for the implementation 
stage. During the consultation phase, public town-hall style 
meetings attended by the relevant Minister and senior officials 
were held across the regions, in third level institutions, and through 
stakeholder roundtable fora. Following 18 months of extensive 
consultation the new National Planning Framework was launched 
together with a National Investment Plan, as part of a wider public 
policy initiative entitled Project Ireland 2040. The purpose of the 
National Planning Framework is to enable strategic choices to be 
made about the future and to provide a general framework within 
which sectoral investment and other priorities can be decided 
upon. As its name suggests, rather than being entirely prescriptive 
the new document outlines the general principles and framework 
within which the entire planning system and investment decision-
making will be realigned. The core concepts relate to achieving 
regional balance, optimising investment through concentration in 
a smaller number of growth centres, achieving compact growth 
within urban centres, and alignment with capital investment and 
infrastructure delivery. Critically, the regional scale is identified as 
being a crucial driver to achieve the range of national strategic 
objectives, which marks a significant shift in thinking.
One of the marked features of previous attempts at national scale 
planning in Ireland was the absence of meaningful power and 
institutions at the meso-scale. The National Planning Framework 
identifies the regional level as critical to mediate between the 
overarching principles of the national plan and the realities of 
implementation and alignment at the local level. In January 2015, 
three new regional assemblies were established (Figure 8) and 
each of them have now been tasked as a priority with developing 
Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies (RSES).  
The RSES are required under the Planning and Development 
Act 2000 (as amended) to address employment, retail, housing, 
transport, water services, energy and communications, waste 
management, education, health, sports and community facilities, 
environment and heritage, landscape, sustainable development 
and climate change. Preparation of these plans commenced in 
October 2017 and each regional assembly produced an ‘issues 
paper’ outlining the business as usual approach and making the 
case for thinking more strategically to optimise the potential of 
the region. Evidence-based, they raise key questions about how 
the region will look in 2030 and how growth should be directed 
and managed. The plans went on public consultation until 16th 
February 2018, interim drafts were produced, with final publication 
in Spring 2019. For the first time, the RSES will require interaction 
with and between national sectoral plans and for the 5 cities 
Key plans and legislation 
related to Ireland
European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). May 
1999. Potsdam: European Commission.
Colin Buchanan and Partners (1968) Regional Studies in 
Ireland. Dublin: An Foras Forbartha. 
National Spatial Strategy 2002-2020 (2002). Dublin: 
Government Publications.
National Planning Framework: Project Ireland 2040. (2018) 
Dublin: Government Publications.
Urban Agenda of the EU (2016). Amsterdam: European 
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MASP Metropolitan Area Spatial Plan
NPF National Planning Framework
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NSS National Spatial Strategy
RDS Regional Development Strategy, Northern Ireland
RSES Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies
54  |  ‘NATIONAL’ SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY
A major conceptual departure from previous attempts at regional 
or national planning, has been the emphasis on balanced growth. 
Although first mooted in the Buchanan report of the late 1960s, 
the discourse over the last four decades was on achieving 
balanced regional development through dispersal which resulted 
in sub-optimal outcomes. The National Spatial Strategy (2002) 
tried to address this by identifying gateways and hubs to focus 
development but the number of them, for the scale of the country, 
meant that dispersal predominated. The NPF is now focused on 
balanced growth with the ‘core’ strategy targeting 50% of growth in 
the Eastern Midland region with 50% to be achieved in the other two 
regions combined.  There is also a significant emphasis placed on 
the role of cities in delivering the objectives and this urban emphasis 
is a significant cultural and policy shift. For the first time, metropolitan 
spatial planning is being embedded within the plan as a key tool. 
announced €3bn urban and rural regeneration fund will provide 
the investment to deliver relatively quickly on some proposals and 
enhance the credibility of the plan at local level. A new National 
Regeneration and Development Agency will strategically manage 
public and state lands for future affordable housing, an important 
institutional underpinning for the ambitious national strategic 
outcomes identified in the NPF.
Towards implementation of the National Planning Framework 
The NPF has the potential to radically transform the spatial and 
economic development patterns of the Republic of Ireland, enhance 
quality of life and aid progress towards environmental sustainability. 
It is ambitious, evidence-based and coherent but also challenges 
regional and local government, the spatial planning system, and 
sectoral planning and policymakers. One of the first challenges 
facing the regional assemblies is how they align the new RSES 
approach with a well-established tradition of sectoral planning and 
policymaking that has characterised Irish public policy.
Policy integration at the regional scale One of the key tenets 
of the NPF is that it promotes vertical alignment in a multi-level 
governance context from central through to local plans and that it 
supports horizontal, cross-sectoral alignment by adopting a spatial 
focus. However given the plethora of state agencies and quasi-
state agencies operating across a variety of sectors, identifying 
all the key actors and aligning them as part of the development 
of the Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies is an important 
challenge. This has already been evident in the context of Dublin 
where across one sector – transport –an estimated 62 agencies/
organisations have been identified as potential stakeholders to be 
consulted about one large-scale redevelopment proposal in the 
city centre. However the direct link that has been made between 
the NPF, and ultimately the RSES for each region, and capital 
investment should be the necessary ‘carrot’ to encourage cross-
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Figure 9
Targeted pattern of population growth in Ireland’s cities
City Population 2016 Population Growth to 2040
Minimum Target 
Population 2040
% Range People
Dublin - City and Suburbs 1,173,000 20-25% 235,000 - 293,000 1,408,000
Cork - City and Suburbs 209,000 50-60% 105,000 - 125,000 314,000
Limerick - City and Suburbs 94,000 50-60% 47,000 - 56,000 141,000
Galway - City and Suburbs 80,000 50-60% 40,000 - 48,000 120,000
Waterford - City and Suburbs 54,000 50-60% 27,000 - 32,000 81,000
Source National Planning Framework, 2018, 62
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Unlike in other European jurisdictions such as Manchester, 
Barcelona or Paris, where planning has been accompanied 
by institutional reform at the metropolitan scale, there are no 
immediate plans to re-align or create new institutional structures. 
Rather the governance framework is predicated on enhancing 
the role of the region and the oversight functions of the regional 
assembly and planning regulator. The NPF does make provision 
for governance reform to be considered at a later stage but 
this would be at the discretion of central government. The most 
fundamental change however between the NPF, its predecessor 
and earlier attempts at regional scale planning has been the 
cross-government commitment to the plan. In aligning the NPF 
with the €116 billion National Development Plan as Project Ireland 
2040, the financial backing required to deliver on the promise has 
been put in place. A number of new funds including a recently 
sectoral cooperation. This was clearly articulated by the Minister 
responsible for the plan, at the launch event:
“By aligning our spatial planning with our investment decisions 
– by aligning the National Planning Framework with the ten-year 
National Development Plan – we will for the first time have a 
meaningful planning framework that people can have confidence 
will deliver for their communities” (Eoghan Murphy, TD; Minister 
for Housing and Planning). 
This alignment of the National Investment Plan with the NPF 
should ensure that future infrastructure investment will be more 
strategically deployed by central government, thus acting as an 
incentive not just for cross-sectoral cooperation across central 
government departments but through various regional and local 
structures. The potential of the RSES, backed by this funding and 
new oversight arrangements, to frame the plans and policies of 
local authorities, state agencies and private sector investment in 
the medium-term should ensure that future development is plan-
led rather than developer-driven as has happened in the past.
Cities as strategic regional growth centres  Given the traditional 
rural emphasis in Irish spatial policy, the new emphasis in the 
NPF on the role of the urban is an important recognition of the 
reality of contemporary Ireland but also exceptionally challenging 
politically. The framework recognises the strategic role of Dublin 
as a capital city, and a gateway to the global economy, and 
acknowledges that growth will continue and that public policy 
should sustain the city. However achieving the kind of equitable 
growth envisaged in the plan can only happen if a balance is 
achieved between the growth of Dublin and the four other cities. 
Ambitious growth targets have been set as illustrated in Figure 
9 for the cities outside of Dublin. However even if these are met, 
the exceptional dominance of Dublin within the urban system will 
remain unchallenged.
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Along with the emphasis on growing cities, National Policy 
Objective 67 within the NPF requires the production of 12-year 
Metropolitan Area Spatial Plans (MASPs) in tandem with, and as 
part of, Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies (RSES). This 
new policy tool recognises for the first time the reality of city-
regionalism in Ireland and MASPs have been given statutory 
underpinning. The Urban Regeneration and Development Fund 
will provide critical funding for the realisation of the MASPs and 
urban development generally in large urban centres beyond 
the five cities. While the MASPs are strategically important, their 
development and subsequent implementation is not straight 
forward. At regional assembly level significant urban/rural 
cleavages, stronger than party political divides, are beginning 
to emerge. For assemblies that are dominated by rural based 
representatives, it will be a major challenge to both develop 
and implement the MASP approach particularly in the context of 
upcoming local elections in Spring/Summer 2019. The National 
Planning Framework as an overarching vision has achieved cross-
party support in the Dáil (national parliament). However given the 
inherently political nature of planning as a process - involving 
strategic choice-making about distribution of investment and 
services - it would be impossible to de-politicise the process 
despite what central government ministers might argue. 
 
The politics of planning in Ireland The National Planning 
Framework has many obvious attributes and transformational 
ambitions, but implementation and its ultimate success will depend 
on learning from the lessons of previous attempts at national 
spatial planning. While central government departments and 
policy appear to be aligning in a way not heretofore seen, how the 
newly empowered regional assemblies, policy tools, and offices/
agencies will be embedded or aligned within existing institutional 
structures is critical and potentially fraught with tension. The new 
National Regeneration and Development Agency (NRDA) has a 
remit to: “drive the renewal of strategic areas not being utilised to 
their full potential, (e.g. through CPO and other incentives) from 
cities and larger towns to opportunities at a smaller scale in rural 
towns and villages” yet how this intersects with regional and local 
government has not been established. One might assume that 
the NRDA role will be to operationalise the RSES and MASPs but 
this is not yet clear. In some ways this emphasis on the national 
and regional level runs contrary to the principles of the Urban 
Agenda of the European Union (2016) which suggests that urban 
authorities as the level of government often closest to citizens 
have the key role to play. However the Local Government Reform 
Act (2014) abolished urban district councils so the county council 
is the smallest unit of administration meaning that for some cities 
and towns, rural-based politicians are making key decisions.  
For the NPF to deliver on its full potential within a multi-level 
governance framework clear functional demarcation is essential. 
Yet elements of the plan seem to blur functions and boundaries 
between different arms of government. One example relates 
to the coordination of development in towns that may cross 
administrative boundaries. The NPF (p. 136) states that in such 
circumstances “[central] government will work with the relevant 
local authorities in developing preparation of joint urban/local 
area plans, utilising current Local Area Plan (LAP) legislation”, 
thus calling into question the role and place of the regional 
level of governance. This is just one of a number of places 
where implementation of the NPF, despite the best intentions, 
may fall foul of politics but it also potentially indicates increased 
centralisation of power in an already highly centralised polity.
A related issue is the effectiveness of the regional tier in Ireland. 
Given the new powers and responsibilities that now sit at the 
regional level, are the make-up and structure of the regional 
assemblies fit for purpose? The assemblies are a nominee-
based regional layer of governance with each constituent local 
authority sending a stated number of representatives to the 
assembly. While theoretically councillors leave their local authority 
identities at the door of the assembly chamber, the reality is that 
local councillors will have the best interests of their county or 
district in mind when decision-making is taking place. The NPF 
suggests that growth within the regions should be redirected 
within and close to cities/urban centres rather than on their fringe 
but rural-based councillors face tremendous political difficulty in 
supporting this kind of strategic change. While the relationship 
between the national plan in its long-term and statutory based 
framework and the electoral cycle has been broken, the same 
cannot be said for decision-making at the regional and local 
level. Even the identification of boundaries for the MASPs is 
highly contentious. Whether the structures of regional assemblies 
require realignment to include some nominees from local 
authorities with other stakeholders, or indeed directly elected 
regional representatives, may be worth considering to ensure 
effective implementation and promote strategic choice-making. 
Future development of national spatial planning in Ireland 
Although The National Planning Framework is in its infancy, early 
indications suggest that the ambition shown in its development 
is being continued through the implementation phase. A Project 
Ireland 2040 Delivery Board was established and first met 
in May 2018 to agree a set of initial priorities and a detailed 
implementation roadmap was circulated by the Department of 
Housing, Planning and Local Government to key stakeholders in 
July 2018. The Planning and Development (Amendment) Bill 2016 
which gives statutory footing to the framework was enacted and 
signed into law in July 2018 enabling key offices and agencies 
to be established and ensuring all County Development Plan 
reviews and Local Area Plan reviews can be rendered consistent 
with the RSES. Recognising that all level of plans require updated 
population projections and new systems and approaches need 
time to become embedded, a period of transition up to 2026/27 
is envisaged for implementation. While pragmatic, the danger of 
operating such a long window of transition is that old practices 
remain in place and careful monitoring and oversight will be 
needed to ensure that transformation is already underway during 
the transition phase. 
One of the key concepts introduced in the NPF is the need for 
a strategic and effective urban settlement hierarchy for Ireland. 
This advocates particular types of services that would be 
available at four tiers through the settlement system: cities, large 
towns, smaller towns and villages, and smaller settlements/rural 
areas. While a strong and admirable principle and an effective 
mechanism for prioritising service provision, critical infrastructure 
and strategic investment, how this is translated through the RSES, 
MASPs, county and local area plans will be of interest. In recent 
years, local public protests about post office, bank and hospital 
rationalisation have been very strong and the politics of service 
provision has become a critical aspect of recent general election 
campaigns and delivered a large number of independent TDs 
(MPs) to the national parliament. 
 
But perhaps the biggest challenge facing the NPF and its immediate 
and longer-term effectiveness is the uncertainty associated with 
Brexit. The National Spatial Strategy (2002) was developed to 
closely align with the Regional Development Strategy for Northern 
Ireland and the NPF has an entire chapter dedicated to Ireland’s 
relationship with Northern Ireland and the broader United 
Kingdom. While the framework recognises the opportunities of 
Brexit for the Republic of Ireland – it will become the principal 
English-speaking country in the EU – there will also be significant 
challenges in terms of harnessing the potential of an all-island 
economy and a coordinated approach to key environmental, 
economic and social issues. National Policy Objective 43 states 
that the Irish government will “work with the relevant Departments 
in Northern Ireland for mutual advantage in areas such as spatial 
planning, economic development and promotion, co-ordination 
of social and physical infrastructure provision and environmental 
protection and management.” (NPF, 109). In the context of a non-
functioning devolved administration in Northern Ireland, this is 
particularly problematic and an impediment to coordinated cross-
border planning. How this evolves in the coming years will very 
much depend on the type of Brexit that is eventually negotiated. 
Wider lessons from 
the Irish case 
• A critical feature of effective national spatial planning is 
alignment with capital and infrastructure investment planning.
• To ensure ‘buy-in’ and create the optimum conditions for 
implementation, the plan and its sub-components must be 
given a statutory footing with support from across government 
departments and across sectors. 
• Recognising that planning is an inherently political process, 
‘de-politicisation’ is not possible but it is important to break, 
as much as possible, the linkage between plan development 
and implementation and the political cycle.
• Institutions must be sufficiently empowered and resourced to 
fulfil their role within the system and functional demarcation must 
be clearly articulated. 
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Abstract
Any discussion about the need for and shape of a national spatial 
plan for England has to start with a recognition that there already 
exists a de facto plan expressed in the cumulative spatial impact 
of national investment decisions. That the spatial ramifications 
of this de facto plan are not articulated explicitly, publicly or 
consciously is a challenge given that it often works to reinforce 
regional inequalities and the privileged position of London and 
the South East in the nation’s economy. This article reports upon 
an initiative which is working to heighten awareness of the spatial 
impacts of spatially blind national investment strategies and to 
promote the virtues of developing an explicitly spatial strategy 
for England.  
Context 
England is characterised by deep disparities in wealth and income 
between and within its regions and cities. Infact the difference in 
prosperity between its most and least productive regions is one of 
the largest in the OECD and does not seem to be narrowing (Gal 
and Egeland 2018). Inequalities reflect and in turn contribute to: 
low productivity, affecting national economic growth; failing 
housing markets; overloaded and underfunded infrastructure; 
underused and undervalued asset, and; inefficient use of 
resources. 
Spatially blind national investment strategies (for example in 
Science and Transport) are wittingly and unwittingly reproducing 
existing inequalities, and reinforcing the preeminence of London 
and the South East  in the nation’s economy. Those affected by 
inequalities often feel excluded from having a voice. There is a 
need to develop an explicitly spatial framework for England which 
is sensitive to and cognisant of the impacts of inequalities on 
communities at all levels and for all places, and which has been 
debated and agreed. 
National Spatial Planning in England National spatial planning 
is not a new concept within England. The 1940 Barlow Plan for 
example played a key role in shaping the distribution of population 
and development across the country, not least with respect to its 
vision for new towns. But this plan was top down and embodied 
ideas and approaches which are no longer appropriate. The 
need for light touch national spatial economic policies has been 
recognised in one form or another for some time in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. 
An unpublished report in 1995 by the RTPI Policy Committee set 
out its policy in support of national spatial planning including 
for England. Subsequently, the case for a national planning 
framework for England - either as part of a UK wide plan or for 
itself – has been made in a number of subsequent clarion calls, 
most noteably in a 2006 report titled ‘Uniting Britain’ (Wong et 
al. 2006). With the further emergence of spatial frameworks in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it has become evident that 
the absence of a national spatial planning framework for England 
represents a gap that needs to be filled. This is also reflected 
in the findings of the 2006 Hetherington Report by the TCPA 
‘ConnectingEngland’. More recently Sir John Armitt called for a 
national plan which sets how regions relate to each other. 
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This need is not however met by the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) for England. Neither the original 2012 version 
nor the revised 2018 NPPF update provide the required spatial 
framework or vision. However desirable it is in its own right, the 
NPPF has paid no attention or certainly insufficient attention 
to spatiality. It is essentially a framework for planning practice 
setting out policies to be applied consistently in England in the 
preparation of local plans and in the determination of planning 
applications.  It is not a framework which sets out a vision for 
the future distribution of population, housing and  development 
across England. In fact, it arguably has had unintended and 
unfortunate development and policy consequences by in effect 
reinforcing past trends. For example, the population forecasts to 
be used in local planning incorporate assumptions of an ongoing 
migration shift from the north to the south of England. 
This conclusion was also reached in the 2012 report by Wong et 
al. titled a ‘Map for England’. This report not only identified a wide 
range of policies for England that had explicit or implicit spatial 
implications for the development of the country. In addition, it 
highlighted the inconsistencies and sometimes conflicts which 
exist between various policies being pursued. 
The Challenge Of 
Fragmented Decision Making
Tackling regional disparities in England is made especially 
difficult because of the fragmented nature of decision making. 
This arises from three factors: fragmented geography, fragmented 
responsibilities and fragmented analytical frameworks.  
The administrative regions used for decision making are unrelated 
to the functional geography of the nation in terms of labour 
markets, supply chains, housing markets and natural ecosystems. 
The new West Midlands Combined Authority area, for example, 
cuts across three different Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) 
areas. As a result, decisions are not taken for coherent areas, 
inter-relationships are not taken into account and Nimby-ism has 
become institutionalised. This not only applies to local decisions 
but also to the consideration of strategic issues. 
Notable recent examples include the methodology used by 
DHCLG to providing guidance on housing need. This fails to take 
account of the framework of HMAs that it itself has previously 
published. The methodology also appears to have policy impacts 
which are out of step with the wider governmental objectives 
of regional re-balancing (for example the Northern Powerhouse 
initiative). It seeks an increase in the scale of housing development 
in the South-East of the country overall by a quarter of a million 
units over a 10-year period. The proposed methodology runs 
the risk of reinforcing the trend for population movement to 
the South-East and a loss of population from northern regions. 
The additional demand is in fact focused on London with limited 
overall adjustment to account for the contribution from the South-
East region. 
These example highlights the need for any sectoral methodology 
to be set within a clear framework of national spatial priorities. 
The assessment of housing needs requires a national view on 
the strategic distribution of new housing development related to 
the wider government agenda for  sustainable development, the 
industrial strategy and social equity and cohesion.  
This need is reinforced by the  structure and workings of central 
government departments. These are critical because of their 
importance and the highly centralised nature of the English 
governmental arrangements. Even though there has been a 
distinct movement to decentralise to and to empower cities in 
particular, the nation will remain very centrally controlled with 
most finance being raised and distributed centrally. However 
departmental governance arrangements mean that policies are 
prepared within different technical frameworks with different 
policy assumptions, in particular different planning horizons 
(see Figure 10). For example, the longer-term inter and intra 
regional assumptions which underlie the CaMKOx policies for 
future development have not been fed back into to (and as a 
result modify) the housing assumptions for the area itself nor for 
the areas from which the additional population is drawn. These 
initiatives have no long term policy nor institutional underpinning 
to give a secure longer-term commitment.
Currently, therefore, strategic policy decisions for England are 
missing any sense of a spatial imagination. The spatial implications 
of national policies need to be made more explicit and linked. 
Housing demand, levels of immigration, infrastructure capacity 
and patterns of movement or spending are derived demands of 
the economy. Therefore, national targets for policy priories such 
as housing need to be more directly linked to the assumptions 
and aspirations of the spatial impact of the industrial strategy 
decisions (as well as other specific national initiatives such as the 
Midlands Engine, CAMKOX, HS2); and they need to be set within 
an explicit and consistent set of assumptions about the future of 
the country as expected or desired.
Implications for Future 
Proofing the Nation
The perspectives currently used to frame national policy are 
therefore generally myopic, tunnel-visioned and often backward-
looking. Policy debate needs to face up to the challenge of future 
uncertainties. We currently suffer from poor vision when scanning 
the road ahead and often blindly follow ever changing route maps 
or are driven by historic predict and provide agenda. Future 
proofing and scenario building are hampered by the need for a 
wide perspective across a range of possible routes, drawing on an 
understanding of spatial and temporal relationships between the 
drivers of change from conventional and unconventional sources. 
This is particularly significant in view of the uncertain future road 
ahead. The future of the UK and England is inextricably tied up 
with longer-term large-scale shifts in the geo-political tectonic 
plates, which are accelerating uncertainty for national forecasting 
and governance This is demonstrated by the following illustrative 
issues with “inconvenient tipping points” waiting to happen:
• Climate change implications for settlement and infrastructure 
in Britain and Europe, and likely effects on investment and 
insurance markets.
• Post peak-oil scenarios for global manufacturing activity and 
transport.
• Potential implications of demographic shifts across Africa and 
Europe as a second-order economic consequence of labour 
shortages in Europe.
• Global water and food shortage scenarios for countries such as 
China and India; even in the USA 30% of US counties already 
have a water shortage.
It is also necessary to be responsive to the accelerating rate of 
change in information technology. This will change the context 
for decision making (e.g. the impact of AI) and also the capacity 
to manage change. In particular, there is a whole new tool box 
of opportunities to understand and tackle problems at all scales, 
as highlighted by the work of the Urban Big Data Centre and 
Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis. They are not a panacea 
but could be  a way of challenging what is becoming a world 
overloaded by data. 
Tackling such challenges requires a structured approach at a 
national level that can allow the spatial-proofing of public policy 
in terms of:
• Analytical frameworks integrating analyses spatially in terms of 
social, economic and environmental systems. At present these 
tend still to be treated in a sectoral way, with impact assessments 
based on flawed spatial constructs, with environmental impacts, 
for example, internalised to the plan or programme area.
• Institutional mapping addressing the democratic deficits in 
society posed by the mismatch of power and responsibilities 
which arise  from a  geography of administrative arrangements 
which does not relate to the areas within which people search 
for homes, jobs or recreation.
• Technical capacity to cut through the emerging overload of data 
and the need to integrate ‘lay’ knowledge in decision making 
and political responses.  
The implications of these wider future challenges to public policy 
are that change is needed: 
• To support the development of fundamental research questions 
about spatial futures.
• To identify and sponsor specific future research needs, and to 
be a centre for the co-ordination and dissemination of research.
• To look at the institutional aspects of how physical and social 
sciences are applied to spatial futures, and to help identify ways 
of improving this.  
• To have regard to how physical and social research and science 
is generated, communicated and applied in relation to the 
definition of problems in spatial futures, and to their possible 
solutions. 
• To develop scenarios and forecasts illustrating spatial futures 
and their implications so that policy is not simply driven by past 
trends.
Professional Response
Regional and local inequalities in England are unacceptable, 
unnecessary and too long-standing. The question for the planning 
community as a whole is who should lead the debate in identifying 
the nature of the problems and the potential solutions. As set out 
Figure 10
Planning horizons in years for different sectors
Planning Horizons (years)
Environment
Transport
Housing
Economy
0 13 25 38 50
Source Author
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by Murray and  Goodstadt (2014) in their RTPI Centenary article 
‘Who Leads Planning? (see also Goodstadt and Murray 2017):“The 
major successes have generally been where:
• Planning policies have set out proactive development priorities 
upstream and not merely a set of reactive control criteria.
• Implementation ‘partners’ have been integral to plan making 
from the outset, and not treated as mere consultees or annexed 
to the plan.
• The plan has been linked to public sector expenditure 
programmes, effecting the delivery of a common vision. 
Behind all celebrated and award winning planning successes has 
been the presence of strong political and professional leadership. 
The great achievements in planning over the last 100 years have 
been led by planners and politicians of vision. In the words of RTPI 
Gold Medallist Sir Robert Grieve they had a vision of “a better, 
more socially equitable, more beautiful future than is now the 
fashion or expectation”.
Towards a Spatial Strategy for 
the UK and England 
It is in this context that the Common Futures Network (an informal 
network comprising key stakeholders and concerned citizens) was 
set up in 2016 in part to compile a Prospectus for ‘A New Vision 
for England and the UK’ (Common Futures Network 2017). This 
set out not only the case for a national spatial planning framework 
but also its scope and components. These are encapsulated in 
eight propositions based around four core purposes of a national 
spatial framework i.e. those matters which can only be or are best 
defined at a national level.
The four core purposes are:
• To set out National Output Requirements, for example, in terms 
of longer-term economic and demographic change to provide 
a systematic and consistent basis for sectoral programmes of 
investment.
• To resolve inter-regional balances for example in terms of 
the relative role of regions in the Industrial Strategy’s priority 
sectors.
• To require cross-boundary action in the national interest, 
for example in terms of metropolitan regions and along key 
regional development corridors.
• To identify ‘National Projects’ which are critical to the 
restructuring of the nation and the opening up of opportunities 
of national significance (e.g. core infrastructure or flagship 
developments.
It is also noted that from experience other national frameworks 
cover a range of sectoral interests which also need to have a 
national perspective. These include flooding, sea defences, 
conservation priorities, climate change targets and inclusion 
priorities. Their inclusion in a spatial strategy may be optional 
but they do provide relevant context for such a strategy and will 
be impacted by it. 
The eight propositions are:
Proposition 1 sets out the core policy content of a national spatial 
framework for England and the UK. These include the following:
• The global role of the UK, and what is required to sustain the 
unique status of London as a trading centre
• A new regional development programme post-Brexit when the 
UK will no longer be eligible for ERDF/ESF Funding or from the 
European Investment Bank
• An urban agenda which sets out the relative role of the major 
cities, and support for ‘left over’ places
• A new rural agenda in the light, for example, of the changing 
politics of food production and the loss of CAP arrangements
• A National Green-Blue Network to set out the green 
infrastructure that supports the ecosystem services upon which 
we are dependent nationally
• An integrated infrastructure strategy that supports the common 
infrastructure that serves all cities, towns and regions
• State of the Nation Reporting (OBR-style body) to provide a 
basis for forward planning and monitoring
Proposition 2 calls for a place-based Industrial Strategy to: 
harness the agglomerative capacity of the UK, and England in 
particular (as a global mega-region); refresh  regional development 
programme aimed at reducing peripherality; identify areas of 
industrial specialisation; link research and development, and set 
priorities and goals for underperforming parts of the country. 
Proposition 3 seeks to integrate infrastructure, to move the 
agenda beyond re-engineering the nation to rebalancing 
opportunities within England, and to open up new development 
areas required to meet an estimated additional 9m population 
by 2040. 
Proposition 4 aspires to building a networked systems of cities, 
understanding and maximising functional linkages between 
cities, building upon, but not confined to, the three existing 
trans-regional priorities (Northern Powerhouse, Midlands Engine, 
and the Cambridge-Milton Keynes-Oxford Corridor), and other 
nationally significant opportunities (e.g. Heathrow-Swindon-
Bristol), as well as the HS2 corridors. 
Proposition 5 works to secure the global role of London, ensuring 
that action throughout the London capital region supports the 
commercial, labour and housing markets upon which the future 
of London as a global city depends, through a high level non-
statutory public-private forum, and also strengthening London’s 
relationships with other major UK cities. 
Proposition 6 calls for more Devolution,  reinforcing the potential 
created by the emerging framework of Combined Authorities 
through a more structured and incentivised basis for collaborative 
action, whilst retaining a safety net for vulnerable towns. 
Proposition 7 identifies the components of a Framework based on 
these propositions identifying the key issues that must be decided 
at a national level for England in terms of the National Economic 
Hubs, Corridors and Networks in support of the National Flagship 
Projects and the national priorities for collaborative action. 
Proposition 8  links Devolved National Frameworks through the 
British Irish Council’s Working Group to provide a common context 
for cross-border cooperation, creating synergies and identifying 
cross-boundary and external relationships and nation-wide 
approaches to increasing self-sufficiency in food, raw materials 
and energy. 
In response to the challenges set out in the Prospectus  an 
independent UK2070 Commission has been set up, chaired 
by Lord Kerslake which amongst other things will test these 
propositions (see http://uk2070.org.uk/). It has therefore set out 
the following goals: 
• Illuminate the imbalances in the nature of economic activity, 
• Illustrate the potential a national spatial economic framework  
• Identify the range of policy interventions required to deliver 
change.
This Commission will report by the end of 2019. This initiative is 
seen as practical implementation of UN HABITAT the ‘New Urban 
Agenda’ agreed at Quito in 2018 and the UK Government was a 
signatory. This makes clear that:
“At this critical juncture in human history, rethinking the way we 
plan, build, and manage our urban spaces is not an option but 
an imperative. Our work to realize this vision begins now... We 
commit ourselves to .. integrate urban and rural functions into the 
national and subnational spatial framework” 
The time is right for action; as Lord Kerslake said in his address 
to the 2018 RTPI Convention watch this space!
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